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Abstract
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n items facing a single buyer. We introduce the
notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the
buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Our main result is that a mechanism of quasi-
polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices to guarantee a (1− ε)-approximation when the buyer
is unit-demand over independent items, even when the value distribution is unbounded, and that this
mechanism can be found in quasi-polynomial time.
Our key technical result is a poly-time, (symmetric) menu-complexity-preserving black-box re-
duction from achieving a (1 − ε)-approximation for unbounded valuations that are subadditive over
independent items to achieving a (1−O(ε))-approximation when the values are bounded (and still sub-
additive over independent items). We further apply this reduction to deduce approximation schemes
for a suite of valuation classes beyond our main result.
Finally, we show that selling separately (which has exponential menu complexity) can be approxi-
mated up to a (1 − ε) factor with a menu of efficient-linear (f (ε) · n) symmetric menu complexity.
∗(kothari@cs.princeton.edu) Department of Computer Science, Princeton University.
†(dm23@cs.princeton.edu) Department of Computer Science, Princeton University.
‡(acohenca@cs.princeton.edu) Department of Computer Science, Princeton University.
§(singla@cs.princeton.edu) Princeton University and Institute for Advanced Study.
¶(smweinberg@princeton.edu) Department of Computer Science, Princeton University.
1 Introduction
Multi-itemmechanism design has been at the forefront of Mathematical Economics since Myerson’s semi-
nal work resolved the single-item case [Mye81]. Once it became clear that optimal multi-itemmechanisms
were prohibitively complex, even with just a single buyer (e.g., [RC98, a04, MV07]), the problem also
entered the eory of Computation through the lens of approximation. As a result, there is now a long
line of work developing auctions which are simple, computationally-efficient, and approximately opti-
mal [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15, KW12, HN17, LY13, BILW14, Yao15, RW15, CM16, CDW16, CZ17].
ese works take a binary view on simplicity, and aim to discover the best approximation guarantees
achievable by simple mechanisms. Only recently have works begun to explore the tradeoff between sim-
plicity and optimality, aiming instead to discover how complex a mechanismmust be, as a function of ε , in
order to guarantee a (1 − ε)-approximation to the optimum. is question is studied formally through the
lens of computational complexity (how much computation is required to find a mechanism guaranteeing
a (1 − ε)-approximation on a given instance?) and menu complexity (how many distinct outcomes need a
mechanism induce in order to guarantee a (1 − ε)-approximation?).1 Prior to our work, neither subexpo-
nential upper bounds nor superpolynomial lower bounds were known in any multi-dimensional seing
for either measure. Our main results provide the first subexponential upper bound through both lenses.
1.1 Main Result Part 1: asi-Polynomial Computational Complexity
Our main results concern a single unit-demand buyer with independently drawn values for n items, the
same seing considered in seminal work of Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg which introduced this domain
to TCS [CHK07]. Specifically, there is a single seller withn heterogeneous items facing a single buyer with
value vi for each item i and value maxi∈S {vi } for any set S . e seller has independent Bayesian priors
Di over each vi (so we say that the buyer is drawn from D :=
∏
i Di ). e seller presents the buyer with a
menu of (randomized allocation, price) pairs (S,p), and the buyer purchases whichever option maximizes
her expected utility (v(S) − p).2 e seller’s goal is to find, over all menus, the one which optimizes her
expected revenue.
Our first main result considers the computational complexity of this problem, which is known to be
computationally hard to solve exactly (unless PNP = P#P ), evenwhen eachDi has support three [CDO
+15].
On the other hand, works of [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15] establish that a 1/4-approximation can be found
in polynomial time. It was previously unknown whether a (1 − ε)-approximation (or even a (1/4 + ε)-
approximation) could be achieved in subexponential time. Part one of our main result provides the first
subexponential-time approximation scheme.
Main Result 1 (Informal, see eorem 4.5). For all ε > 0, a (1 − ε)-approximation to the optimal revenue
for a unit-demand buyer with independent values for n items can be found in time quasi-polynomial in n.
1.2 Main Result Part 2: asi-Polynomial Symmetric Menu Complexity
Part two of our main result considers the same problem through the lens of menu complexity. Menu
complexity, first defined in [HN13], is widely regarded as an insightful yet imperfect measure. Imagine
for example the menu which allows the buyer to purchase any desired set S for a price of |S | (“selling
separately”). is is ubiquitously accepted as a fairly simple menu (perhaps it has “intrinsic complexity”
n, since there are n non-trivial “kinds” of possible outcomes), yet technically it has menu complexity 2n
(because there are 2n different sets the buyer can purchase).
1See Section 2 for a formal definition of menu complexity, and formal statement of the computational problem.
2roughout this paper, we abuse notation and write v(S) := E[v(S)] when S is a set-valued random variable and v is fixed.
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Prior work addresses this concern in two ways. e first simply proposes alternative definitions, such
as additivemenu complexity [HN13].3 is particular definition, however, was later shown to be ill-defined
(in the sense that there exist optimalmenus for which the additivemenu complexity is undefined) [BNR18],
and there are no prior alternative proposals. e second approach is to argue that while selling sepa-
rately may technically have menu complexity 2n , it is always well-approximated by a menu of polynomial
size [BGN17]. e implication is that while the definition is still imperfect, it is at least impossible for
a distribution for which selling separately is optimal to witness a super-polynomial lower bound on the
menu complexity required for a (1 − ε)-approximation.
We propose the first alternative which is well-defined for all menus, the symmetric menu complexity.
Informally, a menu respects a permutation group Σ if whenever (S,p) is an option on the menu, (σ (S),p)
is an option as well for all σ ∈ Σ. A menu has symmetric menu complexity C if there exists a Σ such that
the menu is symmetric with respect to Σ and contains at most C distinct equivalence classes under Σ.4
Observe that in our motivating example where a buyer could pick S at price |S | has symmetric menu
complexity n (the menu is invariant under all permutations), and that importantly the symmetric menu
complexity is well-defined for all menus (take Σ to contain only the identity permutation). Of course, the
definition is still imperfect, as selling separately at n distinct prices still has symmetric menu complexity
2n , but the improvement over standard menu complexity is significant (discussed in Section 1.7). Part
two of our main result establishes that quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices for a (1−ε)-
approximation. Importantly, note that both parts of our main result hold even for unbounded distributions.
Main Result 2 (Informal, see eorem 4.5). For all ε > 0, a (1 − ε)-approximation to the optimal revenue
for a unit-demand buyer with independent values for n items exists with symmetric menu complexity
quasi-polynomial in n.
1.3 Main Result 3: A Reduction from Unbounded to Almost-Bounded
Our proof of the above main results is cleanly broken down into two steps, the first of which we now
overview. We provide a black-box reduction from proving computational/menu/symmetric menu com-
plexity bounds for unbounded distributions to proving the same bounds for almost-bounded distributions.
Roughly, a distributionD is almost-bounded if for each i, distributionDi is supported on [0, 1]∪{W } (think
ofW as some large number≫ n). at is, Di has at most one value in its support exceeding 1.
is step in our proof applies quite generally, in fact to any distribution which is subadditive over inde-
pendent items (see Section 2 for definition). is constitutes a key result in its own right due to significant
gaps in tractability between unbounded and almost-bounded instances. For example, it was only recently
shown that some f (n, ε) < ∞menu complexity suffices for a (1−ε)-approximation on all unbounded distri-
butions which are additive5 over n independent items [BGN17] (and the proof is quite involved), whereas
the analogous result follows for almost-bounded distributions by a folklore discretization argument.
Main Result 3 (Informal, see eorem 3.1). ere is a poly-time reduction from a multiplicative (1 − ε)-
approximation for unbounded distributions which are subadditive over independent items to an additive
O(ε5)-approximation for almost-bounded distributions which are subadditive over independent items. If
the O(ε5)-approximation produced on the almost-bounded instance has (symmetric) menu complexity C,
the (1 − ε)-approximation for the unbounded instance has (symmetric) menu complexity ≤ nC + n.
3A formal definition is not relevant to this discussion, but essentially the definition is designed to address the specific concern
raised: the menu contains a list of (randomized allocation, price) pairs, and the buyer may (adaptively or non-adaptively) select
any subset of options to purchase. So “selling separately” has additive menu complexity n.
4For ease of exposition, this definition is slightly imprecise, see Section 2.4 for a formal definition.
5A valuation function is additive if v(S) = ∑i ∈S v({i}).
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Readers familiar with [BGN17] may notice a relationship to their main result, and a detailed com-
parison is warranted. e main result of [BGN17] asserts that a (1 − ε)-approximation for an additive
buyer over independent items can be achieved with bounded ((ln(n)/ε)O (n)) menu complexity, which can
now alternatively be deduced fromeorem 3.1 plus the aforementioned folklore discretization argument
(e.g., Corollary 7.6, also called a “nudge-and-round”). In comparison to [BGN17], the main qualitative
improvement in eorem 3.1 is that we provide a true reduction from unbounded to almost-bounded dis-
tributions.6 e main quantitative improvements are an extension to subadditive over independent items
(versus additive) and that the approximation required on the almost-bounded distribution is independent
of n (versus O(ε3/n3)). It is worth noting that this quantitative improvement is necessary for our previous
quasi-polynomial results (see discussion followingeorem 3.1), so the removal of dependence on n is sig-
nificant. It is also worth noting that our proof of eorem 3.1 indeed makes use of several ideas developed
in [BGN17], and we identify the connections where appropriate.
1.4 Approximating Almost-Bounded Distributions via Symmetries
eorem 3.1 takes care of reducing unbounded distributions to almost-bounded ones, but we still need
to figure out how to get an additive O(ε5)-approximation on almost-bounded distributions that are unit-
demand over independent items. e folklore discretization argument (roughly: round all values down
to the nearest multiple of O(ε10)) establishes only that an exponential 1/εO (n) computational/menu com-
plexity suffices. Perhaps shockingly, no beer bounds were previously known, so our remaining task is to
improve this.
e unique special case where progress was previously made is if D is heavily symmetric (that is, D
is i.i.d., or there are only o(n) distinct marginals of D) [DW12]. In this case, [DW12] establish that an
additive ε-approximation with symmetric menu complexity nO (s/ε
2) can be found in time nO (s/ε
2) for any
distribution D that is unit-demand over independent items with at most s distinct marginals. Of course,
our given D may have n distinct marginals, rendering a direct application of their theorem useless. So
our key argument here (captured mostly by Lemma 9.7) is to show that every D which is almost-bounded
and unit-demand over independent items is “close” in a precise metric (Definition 7.1) to some D ′ which
is almost-bounded and unit-demand over independent items with at most ln(n)1/εO (1) distinct marginals.
1.5 Extensions
Beyond our main results, eorem 3.1 also allows us to conclude the following corollaries:
• For all ε > 0 andn ∈ N, there exists a finite f (n, ε) s.t. for all subadditiveD over n independent items,
a (1−ε)-approximation can be found in f (n, ε) timewhich hasmenu complexity f (n, ε) (eorem4.1).
• For all ε > 0 and all unit-demand D over i.i.d. items, a (1 − ε)-approximation can be found in
polynomial time which has polynomial symmetric menu complexity (eorem 4.4).
• For all ε > 0 and all additive D over i.i.d. items, a (1 − ε)-approximation can be found in quasi-
polynomial time which has quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity (eorem 4.4).
• For all ε > 0 and all additive D over independent itemswhere for all i, |support(Di )| = O(1), a (1− ε)-
approximation can be found in quasi-polynomial time which has quasi-polynomial symmetric menu
complexity (eorem 4.6). Note that the supports of each Di may be distinct.
e proofs of the first three bullets follow by first applying our reduction (eorem 3.1), and then ap-
plying standard (albeit somewhat subtle) nudge-and-round arguments (e.g., Corollary 7.6) on the resulting
almost-bounded distribution. Note that exploiting symmetries for i.i.d. distributions is considerably sim-
6In contrast, [BGN17]wraps up their additive approximation on a bounded distribution via a specific nudge-and-round tailored
to the rest of their proof, and are explicit that care is required in this step.
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pler than for non-i.i.d. distributions as the input is already symmetric (so [DW12] can be applied almost
immediately). e final bullet considers a non-i.i.d. seing, but again establishes that all distributions
whose marginals have constant support are close (by Definition 7.1) to symmetric ones. Note that exact
solutions for this seing are computationally intractable [DDT14, CDO+15], and that no subexponential-
time approximation schemes were previously known (and posed as an open problem in [DDT14], even for
marginals with support two).
Additionally, like [BGN17], we also consider the (symmetric) menu complexity necessary to approxi-
mate the revenue achieved by selling separately. For the standard menu complexity, [BGN17] establishes
that there is always a menu of size n1/ε
O (1)
which guarantees a (1 − ε)-fraction of the best revenue achiev-
able by selling separately. We establish an even stronger claim for symmetric menu complexity: there is
always a menu of efficient-linear size which guarantees a (1 − ε)-fraction of selling separately.
Informaleorem (Seeeorem 5.1). For all menusM which sell separately, and allD which are additive
over independent items, there exists a menu with symmetric menu complexity f (ε) · n which achieves a
(1 − ε)-approximation to the revenue ofM when buyers are drawn from D (here f (ε) = 2O (1/ε3)).
Again, recall that symmetric menu complexity is still an imperfect definition which assigns complexity
2n to a menu which sells separately at n distinct prices (whereas the “intrinsic complexity” of such a menu
is n). But eorem 5.1 asserts that for all ε , there is a menu of linear symmetric menu complexity which
achieves the same (up to (1 − ε)) revenue guarantees.
Finally, in Section 11 we analyze a barrier example for extending our quasi-polynomial bounds for a
unit-demand buyer to an additive buyer. Essentially, the distribution is almost-bounded, but (provably)
no previous approaches, nor our approach for almost-bounded unit-demand distributions can guarantee
beer than an 8/9-approximation. We believe that resolving this example will be a fruitful direction for
future work to circumvent current barriers.
1.6 Related Work
e most related work to ours is [BGN17], whose main result establishes that finite menu complexity
suffices to guarantee a (1 − ε)-approximation for an additive buyer over independent items. As discussed
above, our black-box reduction provides both qualitative and quantitative improvements on their work,
and makes use of tools they develop. ere are numerous other works which study the menu complexity
of optimal and approximately optimal auctions, but there is not much technical overlap [BCKW15, HN13,
FGKK16, SSW18, Gon18].
(asi-)Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes for a single buyer have been considered in prior
works from a few different perspectives. For example, [CD11] develops a PTAS for the optimal deterministic
item pricing for a unit-demand buyer over independent MHR items, and a QPTAS for a unit-demand buyer
over independent regular items.7 [Rub16] develops a PTAS for the optimal “partition mechanism” for an
additive buyer over independent items.8 e simplest comparison to these works is that we are searching
for a good approximation to the optimal (possibly randomized) mechanism, versus a restricted class of
mechanisms. [DW12] develop a PTAS for a bounded unit-demand buyer over i.i.d. items by exploiting
symmetries. As noted previously, our work provides the first approximation schemes towards the true
optimum in unrestricted seings (and also the first application of [DW12] in asymmetric seings).
A series of works also considers the multi-bidder, multi-item case. Works such as [DW12, CH13]
consider special cases (such as i.i.d., MHR, etc.), and are able to exploit symmetries or concentration to
7at is, each fi (v)/(1−Fi (v)) is monotone non-decreasing (MHR) orv−(1−Fi (v))/fi (v)monotone non-decreasing (regular).
8A partition mechanism partitions the items into disjoint bundles and allows the buyer to purchase any subset of bundles.
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prove that simple auctions can approach optimal guarantees. In the general case, [CDW12a, CDW12b,
CDW13] develop fully-polynomial randomized approximation schemes. ese works achieve polynomial
dependence on the number of bidders, and the size of a single bidder’s support (so with independent items,
this would be exponential in n), and bear no technical similarity. Indeed, one of the open questions le by
these works is whether it is possible to improve the dependence on n when the items are independent, and
our work resolves this affirmatively in the case of a single unit-demand buyer.
Finally, note that the interesting questions indeed surround a (1 − ε)-approximation, and not exact
solutions. For example, [MV07, DDT17] establish that optimal mechanisms may have uncountable menu
complexity. Moreover, even in the case where the marginal of each item has constant support (two, for
additive [DDT14], three for unit-demand [CDO+15]), exact solutions are computationally intractable and
subexponential-time approximation schemes were unknown prior to our work (eorem 4.6).
1.7 Discussion and Open Problems
We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity, and provide the first subexponential time approx-
imation schemes and subexponential bounds on the symmetric menu complexity of (1− ε)-approximately
optimal auctions for an unbounded unit-demand buyer over independent items. Our main technical in-
novations are: (a) a black-box reduction from computational/menu/symmetric menu complexity bounds
on unbounded distributions to almost-bounded ones (eorem 3.1), and (b) establishing that a wide class
of (asymmetric) almost-bounded distributions are “close to” symmetric distributions in a formal sense (in-
cluding unit-demand over independent items, or additive over independent items of constant support). We
also conclude approximation-schemes for a suite of additional classes of valuation functions.
e notion of symmetric menu complexity itself will likely be of independent interest for future work.
Symmetric menu complexity is well defined for anymenu, and is always at most the menu complexity. Ad-
ditionally, an additive or unit-demand buyer can always find their favorite option on a menu of symmetric
menu complexity C in poly(n,C) value queries (see Lemma B.1 for a short proof). Moreover, eorem 5.1
establishes that selling separately can be approximated arbitrarily well by a menu of linear symmetric
menu complexity. ese arguments suggest that symmetric menu complexity is a convincing simplicity
measure for additive/unit-demand buyers, and the following open questions are directly relevant:
Openestion 1. Does there exist a polynomial-time (respectively, polynomial symmetric menu com-
plexity) approximation scheme for a single unit-demand buyer over independent items?
Does there exist a subexponential-time (respectively, subexponential symmetric menu complexity)
approximation scheme for a single additive (or subadditive) buyer over independent items?
Openestion 2. Does there exist a subexponential-time approximation scheme formultiple buyers who
are (unit-demand/additive/subadditive) over independent items?
Still, symmetric menu complexity by no means “dominates” the traditional menu complexity (for ex-
ample, a subadditive buyer can find her favorite option on a menu of menu complexity C in poly(n,C)
value queries, but the same is not necessarily true for a menu of symmetric menu complexity C, or addi-
tive menu complexity C). It is therefore also an important open question (Open Problem 1.6 in [BGN17])
to understand the standard menu complexity required to achieve a (1 − ε) approximation in any of the
seings considered in this paper. In this direction, note importantly that our eorem 3.1 allows future
work to restrict aention only to almost-bounded distributions.
1.8 Roadmap
Preliminaries are split into two sections: Section 2 contains the minimal notation necessary to formally
state and overview our results, and Section 6 contains the remaining preliminaries necessary for complete
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proofs. Section 3 contains a formal statement and brief overview of our reduction from unbounded to
almost-bounded instances. Section 4 overviews our use of symmetries to derive approximation schemes
for asymetric distributions. Section 5 overviews the connection between selling separately and symmetric
menu complexity.
Section 7 starts our proofs with a complete analysis of various “nudge-and-round” arguments (in-
cluding a new one, Proposition 7.5). Sections 8 through 10 contain complete proofs of our main results.
Section 11 overviews a barrier example (details in Appendix C).
2 Preliminaries
In the interest of brevity, we first provide the minimal notation necessary to understand our precise state-
ments and proof overviews. Additional notation for detailed proofs is provided in Section 6.
2.1 Classes of Distributions
is paper considers instances with a single buyer and n items. e buyer’s valuation function v(·) for the
items is drawn from some distribution D (wrien as v ← D), which will always have independent items:
D :=
∏
i Di . We will consider the following classes of valuations:
• k-demand over independent items. Each Di is a single-dimensional distribution. e buyer’s
valuevi for item i is drawn independently fromDi , and her value for a setS ismaxU ⊆S, |U | ≤k {
∑
i∈U vi }.
When k = 1 we say the distribution is unit-demand and when k = n we say it is additive.
• Subadditive over independent items. Each Di is an arbitrary distribution.
9 Denote by Xi a ran-
dom variable with distributionDi . ere exists a functionV (·, ·) : support(D)× 2[n] → R+ for which
a buyer with type ®X has valuation function v ®X (·) satisfying v ®X (S) := V ( ®X ,S). Moreover, for all
®X ∈ support(D), function V ( ®X , ·) is monotone and subadditive.10 We will oen abuse notation and
think of the valuation function v(·) as being drawn directly from D.11
We will use DS :=
∏
i∈S Di to refer to the distribution D restricted to items in S . Note that we will
oen abuse notation and use v(S) to refer to ES [v(S)] when S is a randomized allocation.
2.2 Revenue Benchmarks
We will also be interested in the following quantities. If the parameter D is clear from context, we may
drop it (but sometimes it will not be clear, and we will make sure to include it).
• Rev(D): the optimal revenue achievable by any mechanism for a single buyer drawn from D (for-
mally, the supremum of achievable revenues). We will always assume that Rev(D) is finite.
• RevM (D): for mechanismM , the expected revenue ofM for distribution D.
• Val(D): the expected value of v([n]), when v(·) is drawn from D (not necessarily finite).
2.3 Bounded and Truncated Distributions
In order to formally state our results, we will be interested in the following restrictions on D.
• A distribution D is unbounded if Rev(D) < ∞ (but maybe Val(D) = ∞, no other constraints).
• A distribution D is c-bounded if Prv←D
[
v({i}) ≤ c · Rev(D)] = 1 for all i.
• D is almost c-bounded if ∃X ∈ R so that for all i, Prv←D
[
v({i}) ∈ [0, c · Rev(D)] ∪ {X }] = 1.
Importantly, observe that whenever D is almost c-bounded, we can normalize so that all v({i}) ∈
[0, 1] ∪ {X/(c · Rev(D))} with probability 1 (by dividing all values by c · Rev(D)). Now, an additive ε/c-
9[RW15] defines Di to be a distribution over a compact subset of a normed space, but this is not necessary.
10at is, for all S,T : v(S) ≤ v(S ∪T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
11We refer the reader to [RW15] for some examples of natural distributions satisfying this definition.
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approximation to Rev(D) immediately implies a multiplicative (1 − ε)-approximation to Rev(D).
Our main results will also involve truncating unbounded distributions into ones which are nearly-
bounded. Below we define these truncations formally. e definition below is parameterized by a value
T > 0 and a vector ®p. Intuitively, the truncation operation first replaces all item values > T with exactly
T , and then for each item i independently sets a huge value n2 · (max{1,T })3 .
Definition 2.1 (Canonical truncations). Let D be subadditive over independent items. LetT ∈ R+, and let
®p ∈ Rn be a vector of probabilities. Denote by D(T , ®p) the truncation of D with respect to T , ®p. To sample
from the distribution D(T , ®p):
1. Draw v ← D. For each item i such that v({i}) > T , add i to S . ese items will have their value
truncated at T .
2. For each item i, independently add i toW with probability min
{ pi
n2 ·(max{1,T })3 , 1
}
. Update S := S \W .
ese items will have their value set at n2 · (max{1,T })3 .
3. Set v ′({i}) := T for all i ∈ S , v ′({i}) = n2 · (max{1,T })3 for all i ∈W .
4. (Additive truncation) Output v ′(·) with v ′(U ) := v(U ∩ S¯ ∩ W¯ ) +∑i∈U∩(S∪W )v ′({i}).
5. (Max truncation) Output v ′(·) with v ′(U ) := max {v(U ∩ S¯ ∩ W¯ ),maxi∈U∩(S∪W ){v ′({i})}} .
We also use the notation D(T ) := D(T , ®0).
Our reduction from unbounded to almost-bounded requires truncating the original distribution, and
holds for either the additive or max truncation (or many others), so we will not emphasize which is
used. We quickly parse what is going on in the definition. Both truncations first initialize v ′({i}) :=
min{v({i}),T }. For each i, both truncations then independently select each i with tiny probability12 and
update v ′({i}) := n2 · max{1,T }3 . Aerwards, in order to output a complete set function, v ′(·) must be
defined on all sets (not just the singletons), and the two truncations extend differently.
Observe that whenD is additive over independent items and Pr
[
v({i}) ≤ T ] = 1, thenD(T ) = D under
the additive truncation. e same holds for unit-demand and the max truncation. If all we know is thatD is
subadditive (and Pr
[
v({i}) ≤ T ] = 1), thenD(T ) does not necessarily equalD under either truncation (but
this is fine from the perspective of our results). More importantly, observe that if D is subadditive (resp.
XOS, submodular) over independent items, then D(T , ®p) is also subadditive (resp. XOS, submodular) over
independent items under both truncations. IfD is additive (resp. gross substitutes) over independent items,
then D(T , ®p) is additive (resp. gross substitutes) over independent items under the additive truncation. If
D is unit-demand over independent items, then D(T , ®p) is unit-demand over independent items under the
max truncation. So all of these classes are “closed” under (at least) one of the canonical truncations.
2.4 Menu Complexity
Wewill consider twomenu complexitymeasures in this paper. Recall that the TaxationPrinciple [HDSM79,
GO81] asserts that any mechanism for a single buyer can be represented as a menu of (randomized alloca-
tion, non-negative price) pairs, where the buyer selects their favorite pair from the menu (that is, the pair
which maximizes the buyer’s expected value for the randomized allocation minus the price paid). We will
therefore directly refer to a mechanismM as a menu/list of such pairs (which implicitly includes the pair
(∅, 0)). e first notion we consider is the standard menu complexity from [HN13].
12In all applications of this definition, we will have pi/T ≪ ε .
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Definition 2.2 (Menu Complexity [HN13]). e menu complexity of a menu M is simply the size of the
list |M |. We denote by MC(M) the menu complexity ofM .
e following two definitions introduce our notion of symmetric menu complexity.
Definition 2.3 (Symmetries in a Menu). Let S be a randomized allocation, p be a price, and Σ be a sub-
group of permutations of [n]. en we denote by (S,p, Σ) the set of (randomized allocation, price) pairs⋃
σ ∈Σ{(σ (S),p)}. at is, the set (S,p, Σ) contains, for all σ ∈ Σ, the option to receive for price p the
randomized allocation which instantiates the random set S , and then permutes the items according to σ .
Definition 2.4 (Weak/Strong Symmetric Menu Complexity). We say that a mechanismM has strong sym-
metric menu complexity equal to the smallest c such that there exists an index set I of size c, collection of
(randomized allocation, price) pairs {(Si ,pi )}i∈I , and subgroup Σ of item permutations such thatM can be
wrien as
⋃
i∈I{(Si ,pi , Σ)}. We refer to the strong symmetric menu complexity ofM as SSMC(M).
We say that M has weak symmetric menu complexity equal to the smallest c such that there exists an
index set I and menus {Mi }i∈I such that each SSMC(Mi ) = di for all i, menu M = ⋃i Mi , and ∑i di = c.
We will refer to the weak symmetric menu complexity ofM as WSMC(M).
Above, the idea is that the mechanism designer can present any mechanism M to the buyer with a
description of Σ via its generating set, together with a list of SSMC(M) (randomized allocation, price)
pairs. Similarly, the designer can present any mechanismM to the buyer with a set of such lists, totaling
WSMC(M) (randomized allocation, price) pairs (again representing each Σi via its generating set).
In principle, one might find some subgroups Σ to be simpler than others (e.g., the subgroup of all
permutations, or all permutations on even elements, etc.), but Jerrum’s filter establishes that all subgroups
have a generating set of size at most n [Jer82]. So while some subgroups may indeed be conceptually
simpler than others, from the point of view of how much space is needed to define Σ, the space is always
n ln(n) (this sanity checks, for instance, that it is not the case that all menus have low symmetric menu
complexity simply because they can be cleverly partitioned into few heavily-symmetric parts. See further
discussion in Section 7.1).
Note also that the weak/strong symmetric menu complexity is well-defined for any menuM (by taking
Σ to be the trivial subgroup), and that for allM , we have WSMC(M) ≤ SSMC(M) ≤ MC(M). is is in con-
trast to previously posed notions such as “additive menu complexity” [HN13], as some menus may simply
not admit an additive description (and therefore their additive menu complexity is undefined) [BNR18].
To simplify presentation, we formally define what it means for a class of distributions to have a low
(1 − ε)-approximation menu complexity.
Definition 2.5 (ε-Menu Complexity of a Class of Distributions). Let D be a class of distributions. Define
the ε-Menu Complexity MC(D, ε) of D to be the minimum c such that for all D ∈ D there exists a menu
M with MC(M) ≤ c and RevM (D) ≥ (1− ε)Rev(D). We also define WSMC(D, ε) and SSMC(D, ε) similarly.
2.5 Computational Problems
Finally, we define the computational problem we consider for our PTAS/QPTAS. Below, when we describe
a distribution D as being input, we do not explicitly specify how the input is given, other than (a) it is
possible to sample from D in time poly(n) and (b) for anyT ∈ R, ε > 0, and all items i, it is possible to find
supp≥T
{
p ·Pr[v({i}) ≥ p]}, alongwith an r satisfying r ·Pr[v({i}) ≥ r ] ≥ (1−ε)·supp≥T {p ·Pr[v({i}) ≥ p]}
in time polyε (n).13 Observe that if the support of each Di is explicitly listed and of size poly(n), then both
these properties are satisfied (even though the support of D is exponential in n).
13Observe that this supremum is always finite when Rev(D) is finite.
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Definition 2.6 (Implicit description of a menu [DDT14]). An implicit description of a menuM is a Turing
machinewhich takes as input a valuationv(·) and outputs argmax(S,p)∈M∪{(∅,0)}{v(S)−p}. e description
has overhead c if on input v(·) described using b bits, the Turing machine terminates in time poly(c,b).
Definition 2.7 (Computational RevenueMaximization). A (1−ε) approximation for the problemRevMaxD
takes as input D ∈ D and outputs an implicit description of a menuM such that RevM (D) ≥ (1−ε)Rev(D).
Whenever we say that an algorithm for RevMaxD runs in time c, we mean both that the implicit descrip-
tion is found in time c, and that the implicit description itself has overhead c.
3 Overview: Reduction from Unbounded to Bounded
In this section, we overview our poly-time (symmetric) menu-complexity preserving reduction from un-
bounded distributions to almost-bounded distributions. eorem 3.1 is the main result of this section.
eorem 3.1. For any n ∈ N and ε > 0, let D be a class of distributions that is closed under one of the
canonical truncations, such that every D ∈ D is subadditive over n independent items. Let DB denote the
subset of D that is also almost 1/ε4-bounded. en there is a poly(n, 1/ε)-time reduction from achieving a
(1 − ε)-approximation to RevMaxD to achieving a (1 −O(ε))-approximation to RevMaxDB . Moreover:
MC(D, ε) ≤ n + nMC(DB ,O(ε)) and WSMC(D, ε) ≤ n + nWSMC(DB ,O(ε)).
e proof of eorem 3.1 is broken down into two main parts. e first half, captured in Proposi-
tion 3.2,14 asserts that for any distribution which is subadditive over independent items, there exists a
(1 − ε)-approximate menu of a particular form. Readers familiar with [BGN17] will notice simliarity to
their Lemma 2.4; we discuss the differences shortly aer.
Proposition 3.2. Let E ≥ Rev(D)/ε3. en for all D that are subadditive over independent items, there exists
a menu M such that RevM (D) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D) and:
• For all (S,p) ∈ M , either p ≤ E, or there exists at most one i such that Pr[i ∈ S] > 0.
• For each item i, there exist at most two distinct (S,p) ∈ M such that p > E and Pr[i ∈ S] > 0.
e structure of the promisedM is identical to Lemma 2.4 of [BGN17]. e key difference is thatwe take
E ≥ Rev(D)/ε3, versus their E ≥ n3Rev(D)/ε2. is quantitative improvement is crucial for eorem 3.1:
without it, instead of reducing to 1/ε4-bounded distributions, we would only reduce to poly(n/ε)-bounded
distributions. Our positive results for c-bounded distributions require runtime/symmetric menu complex-
ity exponential in c, so the quantitative difference is significant. e second difference is the extension to
distributions which are subadditive over independent items (their Lemma 2.4 holds for additive).
e second half ofeorem 3.1 is Proposition 3.5 below.15 Wefirst need some definitions. Definition 3.3
describes an operation which appears in [BGN17], which takes a menu M and replaces all “expensive”
options in M with options which award at most a single item with non-zero probability. Definition 3.4
defines a new operation, which takes a menuM and concatenates it with n new options which each offer
a single item deterministically.
Definition 3.3 (Making a menu E-exclusive). For a given menuM , let the menuM |E (“M made exclusive
above E”) denote the menu constructed fromM as follows:
• For any (S,p) ∈ M with p ≤ E, add (S, (1 − ε)p) to M |E .
14Note that Proposition 3.2 is a less precise version of Proposition 8.12.
15Again, Proposition 3.5 is slightly less precise than Propositions 8.20 and 8.25.
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• For any (S,p) ∈ M with p > E, and all items i, let Xi (S) denote the (randomized) set that is {i} with
probability Pr[i ∈ S] and ∅ otherwise. Add (Xi (S), (1 − ε)p) to M |E .
Definition 3.4 (Concatenating a menu with exclusive options). Let ®r ∈ R[n] be a vector of reserve prices,
andT ∈ R. Let also (Si ,qi ) be the option inM that would be purchased by a buyer with valuev(·) satisfying
v(S) = T · I(i ∈ S).16 en MT , ®r (“M concatenated with exclusive options ®r”) is the menu M with the n
additional options
⋃
i
{({i} , qi + ri · (1 − Pr[i ∈ Si ]))}, and then multiplying all prices by (1 − ε).
at is, concatenating a menu with exclusive options ®r adds, for all i, an option to purchase item i
deterministically. e price-per-additional-probability of geing item i beyond what is already allocated
by Si is ri (and then all prices are multiplied by (1 − ε)).
Proposition 3.5. Let M be the mechanism promised by Proposition 3.2, and let T ≥ E/ε ≥ Rev(D)/ε4. Also,
let pi := supr ≥T
{
r · Pr[v({i}) ≥ r ]} and let ri ≥ T be such that ri · Pr[v({i}) ≥ ri ] ≥ (1 − ε)pi . en:
• (1 −O(ε)) · RevM (D) ≤ Rev(D(T , ®p)).
• For anyM ′, we have Rev(M ′ |E )T , ®r (D) ≥ RevM ′(D(T , ®p)) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proposition 3.5 establishes both that the optimal revenue for D and D(T , ®p) is close, and also that any
mechanism for D(T , ®p) can be efficiently transformed into one which achieves similar guarantees for D.
Proposition 3.5 has no real analogue in [BGN17], but replaces their Lemma 2.5. eir Lemma 2.5 specifies
a particular discretization of the “cheap part” of the menu promised in Lemma 2.4 (priced ≤ E) which is
compatible with the remaining 2n expensive options (priced > E). e entire challenge of this process
is ensuring that a buyer with value v(·) who chooses to purchase one of the 2n expensive options from
the promised M does not all of a sudden wish to purchase a cheap option instead aer discretization. As
a result, one cannot simply view the cheap part and expensive part as separate subproblems. e main
insight in [BGN17]’s Lemma 2.5 is that a particular discretization of the cheap part does not interfere
with the 2n expensive options. e main insight in our Proposition 3.5 is more general: the only property
of the cheap part which interacts with the expensive part is the maximum probability with which item
i is ever allocated (and this is captured in a somewhat roundabout way by the inserted point-masses at
n2(max{1,T })3 — see Lemma 6.6). So in comparison to Lemma 2.5 in [BGN17], the key contribution of
Proposition 3.5 is that it provides a true reduction from unbounded to almost-bounded distributions. Future
work (and the remainder of the present work) can simply focus on almost-bounded distributions, rather
than separately ensuring that the resulting menu is compatible with Proposition 3.2.
Observe that eorem 3.1 now follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.5. For any D ∈ D, D(T , ®p) is
almost 1/ε4-bounded. So if we can find a (1 − O(ε))-approximation for D(T , ®p), we can efficiently make
it E-exclusive and concatenate the expensive options, and these changes increase the (symmetric) menu
complexity by at most a factor of n, plus an additional n. Chaining the inequalities in Propositions 3.2
and 3.5 establishes that the resulting menu is a (1 − O(ε))-approximation. A more detailed outline and
complete proofs can be found in Section 8.
4 Overview: Symmetries and Optimal Mechanisms
Witheorem 3.1 in hand, our task is now to design good menus for almost-bounded distributions. Unfor-
tunately, there is not much prior work in this direction (even for bounded distributions). It is only known
that, via an application of nudge-and-round arguments, one can discretize all values into multiples of ε/n
16Morally, one should think of (Si ,qi ) as the option in M which awards i with highest probability. However, if M has infinite
menu complexity, then this option need not be well-defined. e definition is given as such to avoid overly cumbersome notation
with supremums.
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while losing at most an ε fraction of the optimal revenue, at which point an exponentially large linear
program can output an explicit description of the optimal mechanism (for the discretized distribution).
Note that the linear program has size polynomial in the support of D, which would remain exponential in
n even if D is unit-demand/additive and each marginal has support size 2 (as D is a product distribution).
We overview this linear program in Section 9.
Despite this simple result for bounded distributions, prior work of [BGN17] was the first to establish
even that some bounded menu complexity suffices for unbounded additive distributions over independent
items, and eorem 3.1 now allows us to do the same for unbounded distributions which are subadditive
over independent items. A proof of the following theorem appears in Appendix A.2, which formalizes the
above paragraph and mostly follows from eorem 3.1.
eorem 4.1. Let D be the class of distributions which are subadditive over n independent items. en for
all ε , there exists a finite number C(n, ε) < ∞ such that MC(D, ε) ≤ C(n, ε).
One special case where progress was made is if the underlying distribution D is symmetric [DW12].
Specifically, if D is invariant under all permutations in Σ, [DW12] shows that the canonical LP referenced
above can be simplified to have size only |support(D)/Σ| (that is, the LP needs to only consider one rep-
resentative from each equivalence class in the support of D under Σ), which allowed them to conclude a
PTAS when D was bounded and unit-demand over i.i.d. items. We recap (a slight generalization of) their
main result below, and include a proof in Section 9 for completeness.
Definition 4.2 (Invariant under item permutations). We say that Σ is an item permutation group if there
exists a partition T1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Ts of [n] such that Σ is the subgroup generated by
⋃
i {(x,y)}x,y∈Ti . at is,
Σ is generated by all swaps of pairs of elements in the same Ti .
17 We further let s (the number of parts
necessary for the partition) denote the partition size of Σ.
We say thatD is symmetric with respect to Σ if for all σ ∈ Σ, the distributionwhich first drawsv(·) ← D
and then outputs v ′(·) with v ′(S) := v(σ (S)) is itself the distribution D.
For example, if D is k-demand over i.i.d. items, then D is symmetric with respect to the group of
all permutations on n items, and this permutation group has partition size one. If D is k-demand over
independent items and all values for even items are drawn i.i.d., and odd items are drawn i.i.d. (but from a
different distribution than the even items), D is symmetric with respect to the item permutation group Σ
with T1 := even items and T2 := odd items, and therefore Σ has partition size two.
eorem 4.3 ([DW12]). For any item permutation Σ of partition size s, let D be the class of distributions D
which are k-demand over independent items, with each |support(Di )| ≤ c, and symmetric with respect to Σ.
en an optimal solution to RevMaxD can be found in time poly(ncs ). Moreover, the mechanism output M
has SSMC(M) ≤ ncs .
Our applications of eorem 4.3 will first discretize a distribution into one which is symmetric with
respect to a Σ of low partition size, and also where each marginal is supported on not many values. eo-
rem 4.4 considers i.i.d. items, where the input is already heavily symmetric and we just need to bound the
loss from discretizing values. We treat this case as a warmup, but even here our results make quantitative
improvements on [DW12], and also now extend their work to the unbounded case due to eorem 3.1. In
particular, observe that eorem 4.4 concludes a PTAS for distributions which are unit-demand over i.i.d.
items, and a QPTAS for distributions which are additive over i.i.d. items.
17Put another way, Σ contains exactly permutations which separately permute items in Ti , for all i .
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eorem 4.4. Let D be the class of valuations which are k-demand over i.i.d. items. en WSMC(D, ε) ≤
nO (ln(k)/ε
12), and there exists a (1 − ε)-approximation to RevMaxD which runs in time nO (ln(k)/ε12).
Our main application of eorem 4.3 will be on arbitrary distributions which are unit-demand over
independent items. at is, the initial distribution might have no symmetries whatsoever. Still, we show
that it is possible to discretize the distribution in a way which creates symmetries. Note that discretizing
only the values clearly no longer suffices, as there are fully asymmetric distributions even when each
marginal has support size two. So we additionally need to discretize the probabilities. e main challenge
here is that unless our discretization is excessively fine (that is, too fine to improve the runtime/menu
complexity), there will almost certainly be some item for which the original and the discretized values are
quite different. So we need to carefully dive into the details of an advanced nudge-and-round argument
(Proposition 7.5) to figure out exactly which item values contribute to lost revenue. is careful dive
is possible for unit-demand valuations because optimal menus award at most one item without loss of
generality. For additive valuations, there is a barrier to this approach, which we expound in Section 11.
eorem 4.5. LetD be the class of valuations which are unit-demand over independent items. en there ex-
ists a (1−ε)-approximation to RevMaxD which runs in time nO (ln(n/ε))1/ε
7 ) andWSMC(D, ε) ≤ nO (ln(n/ε))1/ε7 ).
Finally,eorem4.6 belowestablishes that a similarly careful nudge-and-round yields a quasi-polynomial
approximation scheme for distributions where each marginal has support at most c (even if that support
is distinct for each marginal). Recall that even when c = 2, no subexponential approximation schemes are
previously known, and this is le open by [DDT14].
eorem 4.6. Let D be the class of valuations which are k-demand over independent items and satisfy
|support(Di )| ≤ c for all i. en there exists a (1−ε)-approximation to RevMaxD which runs in timenO (ln(n/ε))c
andWSMC(D, ε) ≤ nO (ln(n/ε))c .
5 Overview: Selling Separately with Low Symmetric Menu Complexity
One justified critique of menu complexity is that it assigns menu complexity 2n to the “selling separately”
mechanism, which places pricepi on each item and allows the buyer to purchase any set S for price
∑
i∈S pi .
Symmetric menu complexity is still imperfect in this regard: if all pi are distinct, the menu will still have
strong/weak symmetric menu complexity 2n .
[BGN17] provide a nice response to this critique, by proving that while technically selling separately
is deemed to have 2n menu complexity, for everyM which sells separately and for allD which are additive
over independent items, there exists another M ′ for which RevM ′(D) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D) and MC(M ′) ≤
n1/ε
O (1)
.18 So while the definition of menu complexity is certainly still imperfect, we at least now know
that if (for instance) a distributionD admits no good mechanisms of polynomial menu complexity, it is not
because selling separately is close to optimal.
We provide an even stronger response in the case of symmetric menu complexity: when D is ad-
ditive over independent items, and M sells separately, there exists another M ′ for which RevM ′(D) ≥
(1 − ε)RevM (D) and SSMC(M ′) ≤ f (ε)n. at is, the blow up from the “intrinsic complexity” (or descrip-
tion complexity) of selling separately n items to the strong symmetric menu complexity of a menu that is
almost as good is just a multiplicative factor independent of n. e proof can be found in Section 10.
eorem 5.1. Let D be additive over independent items andM be a mechanism which sells separately. en
there exists a mechanism M ′ with RevM ′(D) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D) and SSMC(M ′) ≤ f (ε)n, for f (ε) = 2O (1/ε3).
18Note that “selling separately” is not obviously simple when D is not additive over independent items, so it is not clear that
one should expect/demand such anM ′ unless D is additive over independent items.
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6 Setup for Complete Proofs
Below we introduce the necessary concepts to follow our complete proofs. First, our proofs will make use
of the following additional revenue bounds:
• BRev(D): the optimal revenue achievable by “bundling together” (that is, puing a single take-it-or-
leave-it price p on [n] and leing the buyer purchase iff v([n]) ≥ p).
• SRev(D): the optimal revenue achievable by “selling separately” (that is, puing a take-it-or-leave-it
price pi on each item i and leing the buyer purchase the subset maximizingv(S) −
∑
i∈S pi ).
• SRev∗(D): the optimal revenue achievable by “selling exclusively” (that is, puing a price pi on each
singleton set {i} and leing the buyer purchase the item maximizingv({i}) − pi )).19
6.1 Basic Lemmas
Our work will make use of the following basic definition and lemma. Some definitions we use will instan-
tiate a conditional distribution, and may be conditioned on probability zero events. To ease notation, we
will define any such distribution to be “null” (that is, output 0 with probability one).20
Definition 6.1 (Conditional and Restricted Distributions). For a given event E, we define the distribution
D |E (“D conditioned on E”) to be the distributionwhich outputs a valuationv(·) drawn fromD, conditioned
on event E. We also define D · I(E) (“D restricted to E”) to be the distribution which samples a valuation
v(·) from D, then outputs v(·) if event E occurs, and the zero function otherwise.
Observation 6.2 ([HN17]). For all D,E and mechanisms M , we have Pr[E] · RevM (D |E) = RevM (D · I(E)).
Lemma 6.3 below simply argues that we can count the revenue of a mechanism for distribution D by
counting the revenue of M from each of D’s subdomains separately. is simple lemma is a surprisingly
useful starting point for much of the work on approximately-optimal auctions.
Lemma 6.3 (Sub-Domain Stitching [HN17]). Let Y1, . . . ,Yk partition support(D). en for any menu M :
RevM (D) =
∑
i
RevM (D · I(v ∈ Yi )) and Rev(D) ≤
∑
i
Rev(D · I(v ∈ Yi )).
6.2 Modified Revenue Maximization
As mentioned in Section 3, the key property that maers for interaction between the “cheap part” of
a menu and the “expensive part” is the maximum probability with which each item i is ever awarded
for a cheap price. We also noted that, in a somewhat roundabout fashion, this is captured by adding
a point-mass to a bounded distribution. Making this roundabout connection results in cleaner theorem
statements, because we do not need to introduce a new problem, but the more conceptually clear approach
is to design a modified revenue maximization problem, which we callModRevMax. We will also formally
establish the connection between almost-bounded distributions and ModRevMax (so that our cleaner
theorem statements are completely proven), but our proofs will directly deal with ModRevMax, before
transferring to almost-bounded distributions at the very end via Lemma 6.6 below.
Definition 6.4 (Leovers of a mechanism). For any menu M , define ℓi (M) := 1 − sup(S,p)∈M
{
Pr[i ∈ S]}
to be the fraction of item i which is never allocated inM . We refer to ®ℓ(M) as the leovers ofM .
19is serves the same purpose as SRev∗ ®q (D) from [RW15], and could be substituted everywhere in their proofs. We find this
definition to be conceptually cleaner.
20We only use conditional distributions to analyze a restricted distribution. So if the conditioned event has probability 0, the
restricted distribution is null and requires no analysis. For ease of exposition, we will not explicitly note this every time it occurs.
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Definition 6.5 (Modified Revenue Maximization). A (1−ε)-approximation forModRevMaxD,W takes as
input a distribution D ∈ D, and item weights wi ≥ 0 so that ®w ∈ W, and outputs an implicit description
of a menuM such that RevM (D) +∑i wiℓi (M) ≥ (1 − ε) supM ′ {RevM ′(D) +∑i wiℓi (M ′)}.
Intuitively, ModRevMax can be thought of as the following: before the buyer drawn from D arrives,
the seller can set aside an ℓi (M) fraction of item i, receiving bonus revenue
∑
i wiℓi (M) for it, and then
run mechanism M and receiving revenue RevM (D). e connection to almost-bounded distributions is
as follows: if the support of Di is (say) [0, 1] ∪ {wi/pi }, then the maximum price we can charge a buyer
with value wi/pi to receive item i with probability 1, while using menu M , is ℓi (M)wi/pi + n. So if we
further have that Pr[v({i}) = wi/pi ] = pi , and wi ≫ 1, and pi ≪ 1/n, then our revenue for using menu
M concatenated with exclusive options to purchase item i atwi/pi is roughly RevM (D) +∑i ℓi (M)wi . We
make this formal with Lemma 6.6 below, whose proof is in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 6.6. LetD be a class of distributions that is subadditive over independent items, and c-bounded. Let
also D ′ denote the closure of D under either of the canonical truncations. en there is a polytime reduc-
tion (which makes a single black-box call) from (1 − ε)-approximations for ModRevMaxD,W to (1 −O(ε))-
approximations for RevMaxD′ . Moreover, if the menu produced on the call to RevMaxD′ has (symmetric)
menu complexity C , the menu output forModRevMaxD,W has (symmetric) menu complexity C as well.
7 Careful Nudge-and-Rounds
One key idea in our arguments (and those of [BGN17]) is to bound the loss in revenue from a given menu as
the input distribution is perturbed slightly, or for a given distribution if themenu is perturbed slightly. Such
arguments are typically termed “nudge-and-round,” and the initial such argument is commonly aributed
to Nisan [BBHM05, CHK07].
e simple arguments commonly used do not suffice for our results (see brief discussion follow Propo-
sition 7.7). Below, we introduce two “careful” nudge-and-round arguments. We will actually need the most
careful Proposition 7.5 in designing our quasi-polynomial sizedmenu for unit-demand buyers (and we will
highlight there why we need the careful statement). For the rest of our arguments, either Corollary 7.6
which appears in [RW15] will suffice, or Proposition 7.7 will suffice.
Definition 7.1 (Coupling error with respect toM). Let D and D ′ be coupled valuation distributions (with
coupled draws v(·),v ′(·)), and let M be some menu. Let also SM (·) be some function that takes as input a
valuation v(·) and selects a randomized allocation S available on menu M . en we say that the coupling
error of D,D ′ with respect to menuM is (the infimum over all couplings between D and D ′ of):
δM (D,D ′) := sup
SM (·)
{
E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)[v(SM (v)) −v ′(SM (v))]
}
+ sup
SM (·)
{
E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)[v ′(SM (v ′)) −v(SM (v ′))]
}
.
at is, δM (D,D ′) denotes the supremum, over all mappings from valuations v to randomized alloca-
tions SM (v) available in menuM of the expected difference betweenv(SM (v)) andv ′(SM (v)), plus the same
quantity swapping the roles of v and v ′.
Definition 7.2 (Coupling error). Let D and D ′ be coupled valuation distributions (with coupled draws
v(·),v ′(·)). en the coupling error between D and D ′ is (the infimum over couplings between D,D ′ of):21
δ (D,D ′) := E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)
[
max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v(S)}] .
Observation 7.3. For all mechanisms M , we have δM (D,D ′) ≤ δ (D,D ′).
21Note that this is the same as the first Wasserstein distance between D and D′ if the underlying metric space for valuation
functions has d(v,v ′) := maxS⊆[n]{v(S) −v(S ′)} +maxS⊆[n]{v ′(S) −v(S)}.
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e high-level distinction between δM (D,D ′) and δ (D,D ′) is swapping the order of an expectation
and a supremum. e function δM (D,D ′) first picks the supremum mapping, and then takes an expec-
tation whereas δ (D,D ′) takes the supremum inside the expectation, and is therefore larger. Most prior
work (e.g. [DW12, BGN17]) typically takes a very loose bound on δ (D,D ′)with maxv,v ′∈support(D){v([n])−
v ′([n])} (or perhaps replaces [n]with S ifv,v ′ are known to be identical on all items < S). Some prior work
(e.g. [RW15]) does try to get extra mileage out of the expectation and use tighter bounds on δ (D,D ′). No
prior work has used the truly refined δM (D,D ′) before. As mentioned previously, this extremely precise
nudge-and-round is necessary for our approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer. We first quickly
establish that both errors are in fact metrics, which will allow us to later use the triangle inequality. e
proof of Lemma 7.4 appears in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 7.4. δ (·, ·) is a metric. For all M , δM (·, ·) is a metric.
Proposition 7.5 is our main nudge-and-round argument. e proof is indeed similar to simpler claims
which have appeared in prior work, but more carefully keeps track of the error induced. We include the
complete proof below.
Proposition 7.5. Consider two valuation distributions D and D ′. For any mechanism M and ε > 0, let M ′
denote the mechanism with the same randomized allocations asM , but all prices multiplied by (1 − ε). en:
RevM ′(D ′) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D) − δM (D,D ′)/ε .
Proof. Consider taking the mechanismM , where buyer with valuation v chooses to purchase randomized
allocation S(v) for price p(v). en we certainly have, for all coupled (v,v ′), and (S(v ′),p(v ′)) on menuM :
v(S(v)) − p(v) ≥ v(S(v ′)) − p(v ′).
Now consider taking the mechanismM , and multiplying all prices by (1 − ε). Consider v’s couple, v ′,
who chooses to purchase some (randomized allocation, price) pair (S(v ′), (1−ε)p(v ′)) instead of the option
(S(v), (1 − ε)p(v)). en we have:
v ′(S(v ′)) − (1 − ε)p(v ′) ≥ v ′(S(v)) − (1 − ε)p(v).
Summing these two inequalities together, and dividing both sides by ε yields:
p(v ′) ≥ p(v) + (v(S(v ′)) −v ′(S(v ′)))/ε − (v(S(v)) −v ′(S(v)))/ε
Importantly, observe that the randomized allocation S(v ′) depends only on v ′, and S(v) depends only
on v. erefore, when we take an expectation over both sides, we get that:
E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)[p(v ′)] ≥ E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)
[
p(v) − (v ′(S(v ′)) −v(S(v ′)))/ε − (v(S(v)) −v ′(S(v)))/ε ]
≥ Rev(D) − δM (D,D ′)/ε,
where the last inequality follows by observing that S(·) is one candidate function for the supremum in
δM (D,D ′), so the actual value of δM (D,D ′) can only be larger. 
Corollary 7.6 ([RW15]). Consider two coupled valuation distributionsD,D ′ (with coupled draws (v(·),v ′(·))).
sen for all ε > 0:
Rev(D ′) ≥ (1 − ε)Rev(D) − δ (D,D ′)/ε .
Again, themain difference betweenCorollary 7.6 and the simpler nudge-and-rounds used (for instance)
in [DW12, BGN17] is that Corollary 7.6 aempts to get some traction via expectations, whereas simpler
arguments from prior work upper bound δ (D,D ′) by (e.g.) maxv ∈support(D){v([n])} (or if D and D ′ only
differ in values for items S , then maxv ∈support(D){v(S)}). We will also need the following argument, which
changes a menu (rather than changing the distribution). e proof is similar, and deferred to Appendix A.3.
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Proposition 7.7. LetM be a menu, and let (S(v),p(v)) denote the (randomized allocation, price) selected by
a buyer with valuev fromM . Let alsoM ′ denote a menu which for each (S(v),p(v)) ∈ M adds (S ′(v), (1−ε)p)
toM ′, where for all v ′ ∈ support(D),v ′(S(v)) ≥ v ′(S ′(v)) (that is, it makes all allocations no beer, but offers
a multiplicative discount). en:
RevM ′(D) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D) − E[v(S(v)) −v(S ′(v))]/ε .
7.1 Brief Discussion on Nudge-and-Rounds
Here, we provide some brief context for the above two nudge-and-round arguments, their intended use, and
the relationship to symmetric menu complexity. We’ll refer to nudge-and-rounds provided via arguments
such as Proposition 7.5 and Corollary 7.6 as “nudging the distribution”, and those via arguments such as
Proposition 7.7 as “nudging the allocation.”
Distribution-nudges have been used in works such as [RW15] to prove a “Core-Tail Decomposition”
(en route to a constant-factor approximation). More related to our work, distribution-nudges have been
used in works such as [DW12] to discretize an input distribution, and then find an optimal menu for
that discretized distribution (indeed, we use Proposition 7.5 for a simliar purpose). Algorithms based on
distribution-nudges tend to be constructive, since one can explicitly discretize an input, and then perform
operations on it.
Allocation-nudges have been used in works such as [BGN17] to argue that menus of a certain format
with certain revenue guarantees exist. For example, Lemma 2.5 in [BGN17] rounds (almost) all allocation
probabilities down to the nearest multiple of ε/n, concluding that a near-optimal menu exists where each
option has all-but-one allocation probability equal to an integral multiple of ε/n (which in turn allows them
to eventually conclude that a near-optimal menu exists with a bounded number of distinct allocations).
Arguments which apply allocation-nudges to an optimal mechanism are typically not constructive (since
one cannot explicitly find the optimal mechanism and nudge it without a separate argument). We will also
use allocation-nudge arguments in the proof of our reduction (eorem 3.1).
Finally, we briefly discuss the relationship between symmetric menu complexity and these arguments.
One use of a distribution-nudge (e.g. in Section 4) would be to start from an asymmetric distribution D,
nudge it to a symmetric distributionD ′, exploit symmetries in D ′ to claim that optimal mechanisms for D ′
have low symmetric menu complexity, and then use Proposition 7.5 to claim symmetric menu complexity
bounds on nearly-optimal mechanisms for D.
For allocation-nudges, one might initially wonder whether symmetric menu complexity is so permis-
sive a measure that (for instance) any menu which only uses allocation probabilities and prices in integral
multiples of ε happens to have low symmetric menu complexity, perhaps just because every suchmenu can
be partitioned into a small number of heavily-symmetric parts. We quickly confirm that that this is not the
case via a simple counting argument. Indeed, observe that there are doubly-exponentially-many different
menus which only use allocation probabilities in integral multiples of ε (because there are exponentially-
many different such allocations, and a menu can have any subset of these at a finite price). But recall
that any menu M withWSMC(M) subexponential in n can be wrien as a list of subexponentially-many
(allocation, price, permutation group) triples. If further each allocation/price is an integral multiple of
ε , and each permutation group can be wrien using n ln(n) bits by Jerrum’s filter [Jer82], then the entire
menu can be describedwith subexponentially-many bits. erefore, the total number of menus which have
subexponential weak symmetric menu complexity is sub-doubly-exponential, implying that we cannot in
fact simply get lucky and write any discretizedmenu with low symmertic menu complexity. is confirms
that there really is some structure not only to menus with low strong symmetric menu complexity, but
also those with low weak symmetric menu complexity.
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8 Outline and Proofs: Reduction from Unbounded to Bounded
is section contains a complete proof of eorem 3.1. e reader familiar with [BGN17] will find the first
half of this outline similar to that of their section 2, but we remind the reader of the outline. Recall still that
there are key quantitative differences (which we note at the beginning of each step), and an extension to
subadditive buyers (whichwewill not repeatedly note). e second half of the outline deviates significantly
from anything in [BGN17].
Section 7 contains formal statements of “nudge-and round” arguments, which bound the loss in rev-
enue from a particular menu M between two similar distributions, and will be used repeatedly. As men-
tioned previously, our proofs really make use of these careful statements, rather than simpler statements
from prior work. Section 8.2 asserts that we may restrict aention to the subset of the support of D where
the buyer values at most one item aboveH = SRev∗(D)/ε without losing more than an ε fraction of the rev-
enue. Section 8.3 asserts further that we may make any menu E-exclusive (for E ≥ max{H/ε,BRev(D)}/ε)
without losing more than an ε fraction of the revenue. Section 8.4 concludes that we may greatly simplify
the singleton options priced above E without losing more than an ε fraction of the revenue, reducing them
to only two expensive options per item (so 2n options total priced ≥ E). e conclusion of section 8.4 is
Proposition 8.12, which is a slightly more precise version of Proposition 3.2.
Section 8.5 is where we deviate significantly from anything in [BGN17]. We argue that while one
absolutely cannot treat the search for a cheapmenu and 2n expensive options separately, the only property
coupling the searches together is the supremum probability with which the cheap menu offers item i (for
all i). e conclusion of Section 8.5 is two propositions (Propositions 8.20 and 8.25) which together are
a slightly more precise version of Proposition 3.5. Again, we emphasize that the qualitative contribution
of section 8.5 is that future work (and the remainder of the present work) can proceed to study bounded
distributions, without worrying about how the resulting menu will interact with additional expensive
options added.
We also briefly note that in our proofs, at some points we need for a parameterH ,E,T , etc. to be larger
than SRev∗(D), and sometimes to be larger thanBRev(D). AsRev(D) = Θ(max{SRev∗(D),BRev(D)}) [RW15],
we would not gainmore than a constant factor by tightening these parameters from (e.g.) E ≥ Rev(D)/ε3 to
E ≥ max{SRev∗(D),BRev(D)}/ε3, sowewrite the bounds in terms ofRev(D) instead ofmax{SRev∗(D),BRev(D)}
for ease of exposition.
8.1 Step 0: Further Notation
roughout the subsequent sections, let:
• H ∈ R be a cutoff (which will be instantiated in each statement as SRev∗(D)/ε).
• Bi denote the event that v({i}) > H , and pi = Pr[Bi ].
• Bi j denote the event that v({i}) > H and also v({j}) > H (i.e. Bi j = Bi ∩ Bj ).
• B denote the event that v({i}) > H for at most one item i (i.e. B = ⋃i, j Bi j ).
• B ′A denote the event that v({i}) > H for all i ∈ A, and v({i}) ≤ H for all i < A.
8.2 Step 1: Ignoring Multiple High Values
e first step in the reduction is to find a sufficiently large value H such that we can safely ignore revenue
contributed by any valuation function v(·) such that there exist at least two distinct items i, j for which
v({i}) > H and also v({j}) > H . Proposition 8.1 is the main contribution of this section, which paral-
lels [BGN17, Section 2.3]. e quantitative difference to [BGN17] is that our H = SRev
∗(D)
ε , whereas they
instead take H = Ω(n2Rev(D)ε ).
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Proposition 8.1. Let H ≥ SRev∗(D)ε . en:
n∑
i=1
∑
j>i
Rev(D · I(Bi j )) ≤ 36ε
1 − 2ε SRev
∗(D) + 6ε
2
(1 − ε)2Rev(D).
erefore, Rev(D · I(B)) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D), and for any M , we have RevM (D · I(B¯)) ≤ O(ε)Rev(D).
Proposition 8.1 asserts that we can ignore the revenue contributed from cases where the buyer values
two or more items each above H , because it contributes at most an O(ε) fraction of the optimal revenue.
We’ll conclude the proof of Proposition 8.1 at the end of this subsection, and first build up the necessary
lemmas. We begin with Claim 8.2 below, which asserts that we are unlikely to see many items with values
exceeding H .
Claim8.2. For any t , we have
∑
i Pr[v({i}) ≥ t] ≤ SRev
∗(D)/t
1−SRev∗(D)/t . In particular, ifH ≥ SRev
∗
ε
then
∑
i Pr[v({i}) >
H ] ≤ ε/(1 − ε).
Proof. Consider the mechanism which offers the buyer to purchase any singleton set at price t . en
the probability that the buyer chooses to purchase an item must be at most SRev∗(D)/t (otherwise this
contradicts the definition of SRev∗(D)). erefore, for each item i, the probability that item i is purchased
in this mechanism is at least Pr[v({i}) ≥ t] · (1 − SRev∗(D)/t) (because whenever the buyer is willing to
purchase item i, they are uninterested in any of the others with probability at least (1− SRev∗(D)/t), since
all the valuesv({j}) are independent). erefore, we can also write that the revenue from this mechanism
is at least t
∑
i Pr[v({i}) ≥ t] · (1 − SRev∗(D)/t). As this must be at most SRev∗(D), we get our claim. 
We need just one more lemma, from [RW15], in order to wrap up:
Lemma 8.3 ([RW15]). Let D be subadditive over independent items, and let S, S¯ partition [n]. en:
Rev(D) ≤ 6Rev(DS ) + 6Rev(DS¯ ).
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Consider any two items i, j , and consider the distribution D |Bi j . Observe that it is
still subadditive over independent items (as conditioning on Bi j simply reduces the domain of Di and D j ,
but the parameters for all items are otherwise drawn independently conditioned on this). erefore we
can apply Lemma 8.3 to get:
Rev(D |Bi j) ≤ 6Rev(D {i, j } |Bi j ) + 6Rev(D[n]\{i, j } |Bi j )
≤ 36Rev(Di |Bi j ) + 36Rev(D j |Bi j) + 6Rev(D)
≤ 36Rev(Di |Bi ) + 36Rev(D j |Bj ) + 6Rev(D).
Here the first line follows from a direct application of Lemma 8.3. e second line follows again from an
application of Lemma 8.3, and then the observation that conditioning on Bi j does not affect the distribution
of values for items in [n] \ {i, j} at all, and therefore Rev(D[n]\{i, j } |Bi j ) = Rev(D[n]\{i, j }) ≤ Rev(D). e
final line follows by observing similarly that conditioning on Bj doesn’t affect the distribution of v({i}),
and so Di |Bi j = Di |Bi (and D j |Bi j = D j |Bj ).
Now, let us multiply both sides by pipj to get (observing that piRev(Di |Bi ) is exactly Rev(Di · I(Bi )):
Rev(D · I(Bi j )) = pipjRev(D |Bi j ) ≤ 36pjRev(Di · I(Bi )) + 36piRev(D j · I(Bj )) + 6pipjRev(D).
Finally, we can sum over all pairs to get:
n∑
i=1
∑
j>i
Rev(D · I(Bi j )) ≤ 36
∑
i
(∑
j,i
pj
)
Rev(Di · I(Bi )) + 6Rev(D)
n∑
i=1
∑
j>i
pipj
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≤ 36ε
1 − ε
∑
i
Rev(Di · I(Bi )) + 6
(∑
i
pi
)2
Rev(D)
≤ 36ε
1 − 2ε SRev
∗(D) + 6ε
2
(1 − ε)2Rev(D).
Here the first inequality just sums the previous inequality over all pairs, and reorganizes terms. e second
inequality makes use of Claim 8.2 to upper bound
∑
j,i pj . e third inequality again uses Claim 8.2 to
upper bound
∑
i pi , and also to observe that SRev
∗(D) ≥ (1 − 2ε)∑i Rev(Di · I(Bi )). To see this final claim,
observe that each Di · I(Bi ) is a single-dimensional distribution. So the optimal mechanism is a posted-
price ri , and that price is certainly ≥ H (since the entire support of Di · I(Bi ) is ≥ H ). So consider seing
each of these prices. Observe that Rev(Di · I(Bi )) is exactly ri · Pr[v({i}) ≥ ri ]. At the same time, item i
will be purchased at least as oen as both v({i}) ≥ ri and v({j} < rj ) for all j , i. As each rj ≥ H , the
probability of this laer event is at least 1 − ε1−ε by Claim 8.2. erefore, we get that these prices witness
SRev
∗(D) ≥ 1−2ε1−ε
∑
i Rev(Di · I(Bi )).
To derive the “erefore,” portion of the proposition, we use Sub-Domain Stitching (Lemma 6.3). Recall
that B ′A is the event that exactly the items i ∈ A have v({i}) > H . en for any mechanismM , we have:
RevM (D) =
∑
A⊆[n]
RevM (D · I(B ′A)).
Also, observe that for any i, j , we have:
RevM (D · I(Bi j )) =
∑
A⊇{i, j }
RevM (D · I(B ′A)).
And aer summing over all i, j , we get that:∑
A, |A | ≥2
RevM (D · I(B ′A)) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
j>i
Rev(D · I(Bi j )) ≤ 36ε
1 − 2ε SRev
∗(D) + 6ε
2
(1 − ε)2Rev(D).
erefore, as B is the event that v({i}) > H for at most one i, ∪A, |A | ≥2B ′A = B¯, we conclude that:
RevM (D · I(B¯)) ≤ 36ε
1 − 2ε SRev
∗(D) + 6ε
2
(1 − ε)2Rev(D) = O(ε) · Rev(D).
Hence, whenM is the optimal mechanism for D, we get:
RevM (D · I(B)) ≥
(
1 − 42ε(1 − ε)2
)
Rev(D) = (1 −O(ε))Rev(D). 
8.3 Step 2: Simplifying Expensive Options
In this section, we build on Step 1 to argue that there exists a (1−ε)-optimal menu such that for all options
priced above E ≥ H
ε2
, they offer only a single itemwith non-zero probability. is is again parallels [BGN17,
Section 2.4], except that we take E ≥ H
ε2
whereas they take E := nHε .
Proposition 8.4. Let E ≥ max{H/ε2,BRev(D)/ε}, andH ≥ SRev∗(D)/ε . en for all D that are subadditive
over independent items, there exists a mechanism M such that:
• RevM (D) ≥ RevM (D · I(B)) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D).
• For all (randomized allocation, price) pairs (S,p) ∈ M , either p ≤ E, or there exists at most one i such
that Pr[i ∈ S] > 0.
e main idea in the proposition, just as in [BGN17], is an application of nudge-and-round.
Proposition 8.5. For any menu M , we gave RevM |E (D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
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Proof. Observe that the menus M,M |E satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 7.7, where for any v with
p(v) ≤ E we define S ′(v) := S(v), and for any v with p(v) > E we define S ′(v) := Xi (S(v)), where
i := argmaxj {v({j})} (i.e. the option which keeps only v’s favorite item).
To proceed, let us now use Proposition 7.7 for mechanismsM,M |E and distribution D · I(B). e only
task is to bound Ev←D ·I(B)[v(S(v)) − v(S ′(v))]. ere are n + 1 disjoint events making up B: B ′∅, and B ′{i }
for all i ∈ [n]. Observe that the distribution D |B ′A is still subadditive over independent items, for all A
(this is simply because each conditioning just restricts the support of Di , but conditioned on this it is still
a product distribution).
e first observation we make is the following: if v purchased some option from M which had price
≤ E, then we defined S ′(v) = S(v), and so the only v for which v(S(v)) −v(S ′(v)) > 0 are those for which
(at minimum) v([n]) > E (as otherwise they are certainly not choosing to purchase an option priced > E).
Moreover, we observe that if v purchased an option with price > E in M , and i denotes their favorite
item, then then because all v(·) are subadditive, v(S(v)) −v(Xi (S(v))) ≤ v([n] \ {i}).
Now, we wish to figure out how much expected value can possibly be lost from both cases. For both
arguments, we’ll make use of the following concentration inequality due to Schechtman [Sch99], and
rephrased by [RW15].
Proposition 8.6 ([Sch99]). Let D be subadditive over independent items, and let v({i}) ≤ t with probability
one, for all i. en for any q,a,k > 0:
Pr[v([n]) ≥ (q + 1)a + kt] ≤ Pr[v([n]) ≤ a]−qq−k .
In particular, if a denotes the median of v([n]) and q = 2,22 then for all k :
Pr[v([n]) ≥ 3a + kt] ≤ 4 · 2−k .
is proposition suffices to bound both the terms that we care about.
Corollary 8.7. Let D be subadditive over independent items, and let v({i}) ≤ t with probability one, for all
i. Let also a denote the median of v([n]). en for any T ≥ 3a:
E[v([n]) · I(v([n]) ≥ T )] ≤ 4t
ln(2) · 2
−T−3a
t .
Proof. Observe that
E[v([n]) · I(v([n]) ≥ T )] =
∫ ∞
T
Pr[v([n]) ≥ x]dx
≤
∫ ∞
T
4 · 2− x−3at dx = −4t
ln(2) · 2
− x−3at |∞T =
4t
ln(2) · 2
−T−3at . 
Plugging in above with t = H andT = E, we get that Ev←D |B′∅[v([n]) · I(v([n]) ≥ E)] ≤ 4H2−
E−6BRev(D)
H ≤
O(exp(−1/ε) · SRev∗(D)). e calculations follow by observing that BRev(D) is at least half the median of
v([n]) (whenv drawn fromD |B ′∅, orD — because seing the median as a price on [n] sells with probability
at least 1/2 by definition), and therefore we can upper bound 3 times the median with 6BRev(D) (and also
because E ≥ BRev(D)/ε). e above reasoning therefore concludes the following claim:
Claim 8.8. Ev←D |B′∅ [v([n]) · I(v([n]) > E)] ≤ O(exp(−1/ε)) · SRev∗(D).
Next, we need to upper bound the loss from B ′{i } for all i. Here, we’ll cover two cases, breaking B
′
{i }
further into two events depending on whether v({i}) is unusually large or not. Specifically, let Li denote
22at is, a is such that Pr[v([n]) ≥ a] ≥ 1/2 and also Pr[v([n]) ≤ a] ≥ 1/2.
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the event that v({i}) > E/2 (and v({j}) ≤ H for all j , i), and Ai denote the event that v({i}) ∈ (H ,E/2]
(and v({j}) ≤ H for all j , i).
Ev←D |Ai [v([n] \ {i})] can be handled almost identically to the previous case. Specifically, observe that
in order for the buyer to possibly purchase an option priced above E, conditioned on Ai , their value for
[n] \ {i} must exceed E/2. So we care about Ev←D |Ai [v([n] \ {i}) · I(v([n] \ {i}) ≥ E/2)]. As D |Ai is
subadditive over independent items, we can again just directly apply Corollary 8.7 (with t = H ,T = E/2)
to conclude that Ev←D |Ai [v([n]\{i})·I(v([n]\{i}) ≥ E/2)] = O(exp(−1/ε))·SRev∗(D). at is, we conclude
the following claim:
Claim 8.9. Ev←D |Ai [v([n] \ {i}) · I(v([n] \ {i}) ≥ E/2)] = O(exp(−1/ε)) · SRev∗(D).
For D |Li , it is now wholly possible that the buyer chooses to purchase an option priced > E despite
having low values for items in [n] \ {i}. In this case, we just bound the expectation directly using similar
ideas. For this case, the bound we want has already been explicitly stated in [RW15] (which follows from
similar calculations to Corollary 8.7).
Proposition 8.10 ([RW15]). Let D be subadditive over independent items, and let v({i}) be supported on
[0, t] for all v ∈ support(D). en Ev←D [v([n])] ≤ 6BRev(D) + 4t/ln(2).
As D |Li is subadditive over independent items and each v({j}) ≤ H for all j , i, we immediately
get that Ev←D |Li [v([n] \ {i})] ≤ 6BRev(D[n]\{i } |Li ) + 4H/ln(2). As the conditioning on Li only makes
v([n] \ {i}) smaller, BRev(D[n]\{i } |Li ) ≤ BRev(D), and so we get:
Claim 8.11. Ev←D |Li [v([n] \ {i})] ≤ 6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2).
Finally, we are ready to wrap up:
RevM |E (D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D · I(B)) −
1
ε
(
Ev←D ·I(B′∅)[v([n])] −
∑
i
Ev←D ·I(B′{i})[v([n \ {i}])]
)
≥ RevM (D · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D) −O(exp(−1/ε)) · SRev∗(D)
− 1
ε
(∑
i
(
Ev←D ·I(Ai )[v([n \ {i}])] + Ev←D ·I(Li )[v([n \ {i}])]
) )
≥ RevM (D) −O(ε) · Rev(D)
− 1
ε
( ∑
i
(
Pr[Ai ] · Ev←D |Ai [v([n \ {i}])] + Pr[Li ] · Ev←D |Li [v([n \ {i}])]
) )
≥ RevM (D) −O(ε) · Rev(D)
− 1
ε
(∑
i
(Pr[Ai ] ·O(exp(−1/ε)) · SRev∗(D) + Pr[Li ] · (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2)))
)
≥ RevM (D) −O(ε) · Rev(D) − (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2)) ·
∑
i
Pr[Li ]
ε
≥ RevM (D) −O(ε) · Rev(D) − (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2)) · SRev
∗/E
ε(1 − SRev∗/E)
≥ RevM (D) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
e first line follows just by a direct application of Proposition 7.7. e second line follows from Claim 8.8,
and by partitioning B ′{i } into Ai ⊔ Li .
e third line follows by grouping together terms that are O(ε) · Rev(D), and rewriting the draw of v
from D restricted to Ai (resp. Li ) with drawing v from D conditioned on Ai (resp. Li ) and multiplying by
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the probability of Ai (resp. Li ). e fourth line just upper bounds the two remaining expectations using
Claims 8.9 and 8.11.
e fih line observes that
∑
i Pr[Ai ] ≤ 1 as they are disjoint events, and again groups terms that are
O(ε) · Rev(D). e sixth line uses the fact that∑i Pr[Li ] ≤ SRev∗/E1−SRev∗(D)/E , which follows from Claim 8.2.
e final line then follows by recalling that E ≥ H/ε2 ≥ SRev∗(D)/ε3. So the fraction SRev∗(D)/E
ε(1−SRev∗(D)/E) is
bothO(ε2) and also O(εSRev∗(D)/H ), so the entire remaining term is O(ε) · Rev(D). 
Proof of Proposition 8.4. Simply observe that M |E clearly satisfies the second bullet of Proposition 8.4 for
anyM . Moreover, by Proposition 8.5, if we takeM to be the revenue-optimal (or arbitrarily close to optimal)
mechanism for D, then we get:
RevM |E (D) ≥ RevM |E (D · I(B)) ≥ RevM (D · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D). 
8.4 Step 3: Trimming Expensive Options
Here, we show that any mechanism of the form promised by Proposition 8.4 can be further simplified to
have only 2n options priced above E. e approach we take is again similar to [BGN17, Section 2.5], with
the main substantive difference that we require only E ≥ H/ε2 (versus E ≥ nH ).
Proposition 8.12. Let E ≥ max{H/ε2,BRev(D)/ε}, and H ≥ SRev∗(D)/ε . en for all D that are subaddi-
tive over independent items, there exists a mechanism M such that:
• RevM (D) ≥ RevM
(
D · I(B)) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D).
• For all (randomized allocation, price) pairs (S,p) ∈ M , either p ≤ E, or there exists at most one i such
that Pr[i ∈ S] > 0.
• For each item i, there exist at most two distinct (randomized allocation, price) pairs (S,p) ∈ M such that
p > E and Pr[i ∈ S] > 0. Moreover, one of these options has Pr[i ∈ S] = 1.
We will again conclude the proof of Proposition 8.12 at the end of the section, and build up lemmas
first. We will provide a complete proof below, and identify which lemmas have appeared in prior work.
To begin, let M denote the mechanism promised by Proposition 8.4, and let Mi denote the subset of
the M containing all (S,p) for which p > E and Pr[i ∈ S] > 0. Let also M∗ := M \ (∪iMi ) denote the
options on M priced ≤ E. We first argue that it is without loss to remove from Mi any options which
are never purchased. Lemma 8.13 below characterizing options in Mi which are never purchased comes
from [RZ83].
Lemma 8.13 ([RZ83]). Say that (S,p) ∈ Mi dominates a distinct (T ,q) ∈ Mi if:
• Pr[i ∈ S] ≥ Pr[i ∈ T ].
• p/Pr[i ∈ S] ≤ q/Pr[i ∈ T ].
en if M ′i denotes the subset of Mi which is undominated by any other element of Mi , and we update
M ′ := M∗ ∪ (∪iM ′i ), we have RevM (D) = RevM ′(D).
For the remainder of this section, we will therefore assume w.l.o.g. that noMi contains any dominated
option (which implies that Mi contains no distinct options (S,p) , (T ,q) with Pr[i ∈ S] = Pr[i ∈ T ], and
also that for any (S,p), (T ,q) ∈ Mi that Pr[i ∈ S] > Pr[i ∈ T ] ⇒ p > q). Now define qi := inf (S,p)∈Mi {Pr[i ∈
S]} and pi := inf (S,p)∈Mi {p}. Like [BGN17], we think of each of the options inMi as allocating at least a qi
fraction of item i for pi , and then additionally allocating a Pr[i ∈ S] − qi fraction of item i for p − pi .
Definition 8.14. We will denote the expensive interval Ci for item i as the range of values c such that a
buyer with value c for item i and 0 for all other items would choose to purchase an option inMi frommenu
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M . Observe that certainlyCi ⊆ [E,∞), and in factCi ⊆ [pi/qi ,∞), but also perhapsCi is an open interval,
or perhaps the lower endpoint is much larger. Denote by ci the lower endpoint of Ci (noting that maybe
ci ∈ Ci , or maybe not).
Observation 8.15 observes an upper bound on the revenue achievable by M , by breaking down its
revenue into that coming fromM∗, and that coming from theMis. is idea is explicit in [BGN17].
Observation 8.15. RevM (D · I(B)) ≤ RevM∗(D · I(B ∧∀i, v({i}) < Ci ))+∑i RevMi (Di · I(B ∧v({i}) ∈ Ci )).
Proof. First, consider anyv such thatv({i}) < Ci for all i. en certainly suchv will purchase an option on
M∗, by definition ofCi . So the revenue that suchv contributes toM is exactly the same as their contribution
toM∗. Next, consider anyv such thatv({i}) ∈ Ci for some i (note that coinciding with event B means there
is at most one such i). Say that this buyer purchases an option from Mi inM . en because all options in
Mi offer only item i with non-zero probability, if we zero out their values for all other options, they would
still purchase exactly the same option from Mi when presented with only options in Mi . erefore, the
contribution of such a v(·) to M is exactly their contribution to Mi , and is counted correctly (in fact, it is
not even overcounted, since there can be at most one such i with v({i}) ∈ Ci when event B occurs).
When v is such that v({i}) ∈ Ci for some i, but v chooses to purchase an option inM∗ inM , they pay
at most E. As v({i}) ∈ Ci , they will certainly purchase a non-trivial option from Mi when presented only
with Mi , and will pay at least E. erefore, the contribution of such v to M is also (over-)counted by the
right-hand side.
We have shown that for all v in the support of D · I(B), the contribution of purchases from v to the
LHS is always at most the contribution to the RHS. 
Observation 8.15 asserts that the revenue achieved by menu M on D can be upper bounded cleanly
by a contribution from M∗ in isolation, and contributions from Mi on single-dimensional distributions in
isolation. We next argue that certain mechanisms for Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci ) can be included withM∗ without
losing much of their revenue. Lemma 8.16 is also explicit in [BGN17], although quantitatively weaker.
Lemma 8.16. Let {M ′i }i∈[n] be a set of menus each offering only item i such that:
• Each M ′i contains only undominated options.
• At least one option (S,p) ∈ M ′i has Pr[i ∈ S] ≥ qi and p = Pr[i ∈ S] · ci .
• All options (S,p) ∈ M ′i have p ≥ Pr[i ∈ S] · ci .
Define M ′ := M∗ ∪ (∪iM ′i ), and define M ′′ to be M ′ aer multiplying all prices by (1 − ε). en:
RevM ′′
(
D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε) · RevM∗ (D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci ))
+ (1 − ε)2
∑
i
RevM ′i
(
Di · I(B ∧v({i}) ∈ Ci )
) − O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proof. We will do this with parallel applications of Proposition 7.5, by breaking down event B into events
B ∧ (∀i, v({i}) < Ci ) and B ∧ (v({i}) ∈ Ci ) (separately for each i).
First, consider v drawn such that v({i}) < Ci for all i. en on the le-hand side (when purchasing
from M ′′), such a v either purchases its favorite option from M∗ (aer the discount), or some option from
M ′i (aer the discount).
Let (S,p) denote v’s favorite option from M∗ (before the discounts). en such a v will contribute
(1− ε)p to the RHS. Aer the discounts, their favorite option fromM∗ might change, but not to one priced
≤ (1−ε)p (because higher-priced options are discounted more heavily). Also, theymay choose to purchase
fromM ′′ an option from one of the discountedM ′i s, but not paying ≤ (1−ε)E, which is certainly ≥ (1−ε)p,
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as every option onM∗ has price at most E. So a v, such that v({i}) < Ci , contributes at least (1− ε)p to the
LHS, and at most (1 − ε)p to the RHS. is allows us to conclude:
Claim 8.17. RevM ′′
(
D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )
) ≥ (1 − ε) · RevM∗ (D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )) .
Next, consider a v such that v({i}) ∈ Ci and event B is satisfied. Note that the additional restriction
to B implies that v({j}) < H for all j , i. If we then denote B∗i the event that v({i}) ∈ Ci and v({j}) < H
for all j , i, then we again see that D |B∗i is subadditive over independent items. Consider also the abuse
of notation which defines Di |(v({i}) ∈ Ci ) to be the distribution which first draws Xi ← Di |(v({i}) ∈ Ci ),
and then defines v(S) := v(S ∩ {i}) (that is, the distribution is essentially only over values for item i, but
we extend it to a distribution over n-item valuations by ignoring any items , i).
We first observe that, because anyv ′ ← Di |(v({i}) ∈ Ci ) has zero value for all other items, and because
there is an option onM ′i which provides at least as much utility as receiving item i with probability qi and
paying pi for it, that such v
′ will always purchase an option from M ′i (before or aer the discounts) when
presented with menuM ′ (this is because, by definition of Ci , such buyers have higher utility for receiving
item i with probability qi and paying pi than any option on M
∗, and such options only become more
aractive aer the discounts, because they are more expensive than any option on M∗). We therefore
immediately get that:
RevM ′
(
Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci
)
= RevM ′i
(
Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci
)
.
Now we wish to use this to bound RevM ′′(Di |B∗i ). So consider two coupled draws v,v ′ from D |B∗i and
Di |(v({i}) ∈ Ci ), coupled by Xi . en as v({i}) = v ′({i}), and both distributions are subadditive (over
independent items), we have that the maximum possible value of |v(S) − v ′(S)| is v([n] \ {i}). at is, for
any menuM ′ (and in particular, theM ′ we’ve defined above):
δM ′(D |B∗i , Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci ) ≤ Ev←D |B∗i [v([n] \ {i})] = Ev←D [n]\{i} |B∗i [v([n] \ {i})].
Observe also that as D[n]\{i } |B∗i is subadditive over independent items, and hasv({j}) ≤ H for all j , we
get immediately from Proposition 8.10 that:
Ev←D [n]\{i} |B∗
i
[v([n] \ {i})] ≤ 6BRev(D[n]\{i } |B∗i ) + 4H/ln(2) ≤ 6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2).
erefore, Proposition 7.5 immediately lets us conclude the following claim:
Claim 8.18. We have
RevM ′′(D |B∗i ) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM ′(Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci ) − (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))/ε
= (1 − ε)RevM ′i (Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci ) − (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))/ε .
Now using the above claims we can wrap up the proof of Lemma 8.16 as:
RevM ′′(D · I(B)) = RevM ′′(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )) +
∑
i
RevM ′′(D · I(B ∧v({i}) ∈ Ci )).
≥ (1 − ε)RevM∗(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )) +
∑
i
Pr[B∗i ] · RevM ′′(D |B∗i ).
≥ (1 − ε)RevM∗(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci ))
+
∑
i
Pr[B∗i ] ·
(
(1 − ε)RevM ′i (Di |v({i}) ∈ Ci ) −
(
6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))/ε) .
≥ (1 − ε)RevM∗(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )
+
∑
i
(1 − ε)2RevM ′i (Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci )) −
∑
i
Pr[B∗i ]
(
6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))/ε .
≥ (1 − ε)RevM∗(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci ))
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+∑
i
(1 − ε)2RevM ′i (Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci )) −
SRev
∗(D)/E
1 − SRev∗(D)/E
(
6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))/ε .
≥ (1 − ε)RevM∗(D · I(B ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci )
+
∑
i
(1 − ε)2RevM ′
i
(Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci )) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
Here the first equality above follows directly from Sub-Domain Stitching (Lemma 6.3). e second inequal-
ity follows fromClaim 8.17, and by rewriting the revenue of a restricted distribution as that of a conditional
distribution times the probability of the event (and recalling that B∗i is exactly B ∧v({i}) ∈ Ci ).
e third inequality follows directly from Claim 8.18. e fourth inequality follows by observing that
event B occurswith probability at least 1−ε conditioned onv({i}) ∈ Ci (becauseB occurs as long as all other
values are ≤ H , and the complement of this can occur with probability at most ε without contradicting the
definition of SRev∗(D)), and converting back from a conditional distribution to a restricted distribution.
e fih inequality follows by observing that Pr[B∗i ] ≤ Pr[v({i}) ∈ Ci ] ≤ Pr[v({i}) ≥ E]. Moreover,
we must have that
∑
i Pr[v({i}) ≥ E] ≤ SRev
∗(D)/E
1−SRev∗(D)/E (Claim 8.2). erefore,
∑
i Pr[B∗i ] ≤ SRev
∗(D)/E
1−SRev∗(D)/E .
e final inequality follows by the assumptions on E. Certainly SRev∗(D)/E = O(ε3), so SRev∗(D)/E1−SRev∗(D)/E
times 6BRev(D)/ε isO(ε2)·Rev(D). Similarly, E ≥ H/ε2, so SRev∗(D)/E ≤ ε2SRev∗(D)/H , so (SRev∗(D)/E)·
H/ε = O(ε) · SRev∗(D)). 
Observation 8.15 and Lemma 8.16 together assert that the only difference between RevM (D · I(B)) and
RevM ′′(D ·I(B)) comes via the revenuesMi vs. M ′i on single-dimensional distributions. So the last remaining
step is to argue that there exists an M ′i of the desired simple form with RevM ′i (Di · I(B ∧ v({i}) ∈ Ci )) ≥
RevMi (Di · I(B ∧ v({i}) ∈ Ci )). Lemma 8.19 is also explicit in [BGN17], although the reader familiar with
Myerson’s theory of virtual values may find the proof below simpler.
Lemma 8.19. Let ri denote the Myerson reserve for the distribution Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci ), and let M ′i have
only two options: receive item i with probability qi for price pi , or receive item i with probability 1 for price
pi + (1 − pi )ri . en:
RevM ′i (Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci )) ≥ RevMi (Di · I(v({i}) ∈ Ci ).
Proof. Intuitively, the proof will follow by arguing that M ′i is the optimal mechanism which contains the
option to receive item i with probability qi for price pi , and that Mi is some auction with this property,
and therefore the revenue of M ′i can only be higher. ere is some work to take care of the fact that Mi
doesn’t necessarily contain the option to receive item i with probability qi for price pi (but just a sequence
of options approaching this), and also it is rather messy to prove that a mechanism is optimal from first
principles. To give a short and direct proof, we will rely on Myerson’s theory of virtual values [Mye81].
Specifically, let φ¯i (v) denote theMyerson ironed virtual value associatedwith distributionDi |(v({i}) ∈ Ci )
for valuev. en the following facts all follow from the definition of ironed virtual values [Mye81, Har11]:
• φ¯i (·) is defined on the support of Di |(v({i}) ∈ Ci ), which is just Ci .
• ri = inf{v | φ¯i (v) ≥ 0} (note the optimal reserve for D |F and D · I(F ) are identical for any event F ).
• φ¯i (v) ≥ 0 for all v > ri .
• φ¯i (v) < 0 for all v < ri .
• e revenue from anymenu is upper bounded byEv←Di ·I(v({i })∈Ci )[xi (v)·φ¯i (v)], where xi (v) denotes
the allocation probability of item i for the menu option which v chooses to purchase.
• Equality holds in the bullet above whenever xi (·) is constant in any interval contained in Ci where
φ¯i (·) is constant.
25
e bullets above suffice for our claim. Indeed, observe that for any v ∈ Ci , this value v certainly
purchases an option from Mi which awards item i with probability at least qi (by definition of qi ,pi ,Ci ).
In addition, observe that any v > ri purchases an option which awards item i with probability at most 1.
On the other hand, inM ′i , every value v ∈ Ci ∩ [0, ri ) chooses to receive the item with probability only
qi , and everyv > ri receives the itemwith probability 1 (depending on the exact value of φ¯(ri ), xi (ri ) could
be set to be either qi or 1. Specifically, if φ¯i (ri ) ≥ 0, set xi (ri ) = 1. Otherwise, set φ¯i (ri ) = 0). erefore, we
conclude that:
• In the range where φ¯i (v) is negative,Mi awards a weakly higher allocation probability thanM ′i .
• In the range where φ¯i (v) is non-negative,Mi awards a weakly lower allocation probability thanM ′i .
• As M ′i has constant allocation probability whenever φ¯(·) is constant, the revenue from M ′i is equal
to the ironed virtual value upper bound.
e first two bullets conclude that the ironed virtual value upper bound for M ′i exceeds that of Mi .
erefore, the revenue of Mi is at most the ironed virtual value upper bound of Mi , which is at most the
ironed virtual value upper bound ofM ′i , which is the revenue ofM
′
i . 
And now we can wrap up the proof of Proposition 8.12.
Proof of Proposition 8.12. We have the following sequences of inequalities, starting from any mechanism
M of the form promised by Proposition 8.4. For thisM , defineM∗,Mi ,Ci ,M ′i ,M
′′ as above. Now
(1 −O(ε))Rev(D) ≤ (1 − ε)2RevM (D · I(B))
≤ (1 − ε)2RevM∗(D · I(B) ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci ) + (1 − ε)2
∑
i
RevMi
(
Di · I(B∗i )
)
≤ (1 − ε)2RevM∗(D · I(B) ∧ ∀i, v({i}) < Ci ) + (1 − ε)2
∑
i
RevM ′
i
(
Di · I(B∗i )
)
≤ RevM ′′
(
D · I(B)) +O(ε) · Rev(D)
⇒ RevM ′′(D) ≥ RevM ′′
(
D · I(B)) ≥ (1 −O(ε)) · Rev(D).
Here the first line follows directly from Proposition 8.4. e second line is a direct application of Obser-
vation 8.15. e third line is a direct application of Lemma 8.19. e fourth line is a direct application of
Lemma 8.16. e fih line just observes that RevM ′′(D) ≥ RevM ′′(D · I(B)). 
8.5 A Reduction from Unbounded to Bounded
From here, the next step is to separately find a good menu for the role of M∗ with low menu complexity,
observing that it need only consider options priced ≤ E, and therefore seems like a bounded problem. is
part is true, but one needs to be careful with changing M∗ as it will also impact what options on M ′i are
purchased. Indeed, if we carelessly change M∗ to (for instance) offer item i with probability much larger
than the originalM∗, this will cause buyers who previously purchased an expensive option onM ′i to now
possibly prefer a cheaper option in M∗. As such, a careless nudge-and-round discretization to get a new
M∗ runs a substantial risk, and [BGN17] addresses this by directly tailoring a nudge-and-round so as not
to interfere with the expensive parts of the menu.
We take a different approach, and observe that while it is true that we can’t be completely careless with
M∗, we don’t need to be particularly careful either. We show that the only important aspect ofM∗ which
must be preserved is the supremum probability with which any option awards item i (and this maers for
all i). But as long as this is preserved, there is lile interference with the expensive part of the menu. Parts
of this proof will look similar to step three (and indeed, an argument like the one we present below could
replace step three entirely), but we provide it aer step three because notation will be greatly simplified
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with only 2n expensive options. e proof comes in two steps. First, we derive an upper bound on the
revenue of M , and then we show that this upper bound can be achieved by separately designing a menu
for D(T ) and later adding the expensive options.
Proposition 8.20. Let T ≥ E/ε ≥ max{H/ε3,BRev(D)/ε2}, and H ≥ SRev∗(D)/ε . LetM be the mechanism
promised by Proposition 8.12. en:
(1 −O(ε))RevM (D · I(B)) ≤ sup
M ′
{
RevM ′(D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
}
.
Proof. Let us begin by establishing an upper bound on RevM (D). We first introduce notation:
• For each i, let (Si,1,pi,1), ({i},pi,2 ) denote the two options for item i which are priced higher than E
(if there aren’t two distinct options, just set (Si,1,pi,1) := ({i},pi,2 ). If neither option exists, then this
definition is void and will never be invoked).
• Let bi := Pr[i ∈ Si,1].
• Let yi denote the minimum value such that a buyer with value v(S) = yi |S ∩ {i}| would purchase
(Si,1,pi,1) from M .
• Let zi denote the minimum value such that a buyer with valuev({i}) = zi would purchase ({i},pi,2 )
over (Si,1,pi,1).
• Let ai denote the supremum allocation probability of geing item i from an option in M priced at
most E.
Observation 8.21. e following bounds on pi,1,pi,2 hold:
pi,2 = pi,1 + zi (1 − bi ).
pi,1 ∈ [yi (bi − ai ),yi (bi − ai ) + E].
pi,2 ∈ [zi (1 − bi ) + yi (bi − ai ), zi (1 − bi ) + yi (bi − ai ) + E].
Proof. e first line follows immediately from the definition of zi . e third line follows immediately from
the first two. e second line follows from incentive constraints: there is some option on the menu M
with probability ai of giving item i (or a sequence of options approaching this probability). e price of
this option is between 0 and E (or the prices of all options in the sequence are between 0 and E). e price
therefore cannot be less than (yi − ε)(bi − ai ), or else we’d contradict the definition of yi : a buyer with
value v(S) = (yi − ε)|S ∩ {i}| would prefer (Si,1,pi,1) to any option which awards item i with probability
≤ ai even for free. Similarly, the price cannot be more than yi (bi − ai + ε) + E, or else a buyer with value
v(S) = yi |S ∩ {i}| would strictly prefer to pay E and get item i with probability ai − ε for price E, and such
an option is certainly on the menuM , contradicting the definition of yi . 
Now, we wish to use this notation to specify an upper bound on RevM (D · I(B)). e plan of aack
will be as follows. First, we will define a distribution D ′ · I(B) which zeroes out values for all items j , i
wheneverv({i}) is high, and claim that this can only improve the revenue thatM gets. Next, we will argue
that truncating D ′ at T does not hurt the revenue of D ′ by much. Finally, we will couple D ′(T ) with D(T )
using Proposition 7.5 and claim that the revenue further lost is not much.
We begin by defining D ′ · I(B). First, draw v ← D · I(B). If for all i, v({i}) < yi , output v ′ := v.
Otherwise, there must exist at most one i for whichv({i}) ≥ yi (because of event B). Output the valuation
v ′ with v ′(S) := v(S ∩ {i}). at is, zero out all values for v ′({j}) for j , i (and keep v ′ subadditive). We
first claim that:
Claim 8.22. RevM (D · I(B)) ≤ RevM (D ′ · I(B)).
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Proof. Consider the contribution of a value v to the LHS and its couple v ′ to the RHS. If v({i}) < yi for
all i, then v = v ′, and they purchase the same option from M and therefore contribute the same revenue.
If there exists an i for which v({i}) ≥ yi , then v and v ′ have the same preferences between (Si,1,pi,1)
and ({i},pi,2 ), but maybe v prefers a cheaper option priced ≤ E (whereas v ′ certainly prefers one of these
options). erefore, v ′ makes a more expensive purchase than v. 
Next, we want to argue that truncatingD ′ atT doesn’t affect the revenue ofD ′ by much. LetM ′ denote
the mechanismM aer removing all options which are never purchased by any buyer with v({i}) < T for
all i.
Claim 8.23. RevM (D ′ · I(B)) ≤ RevM ′(D ′(T ) · I(B)) +∑i ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )) +O(ε)SRev∗(D).
Proof. Again consider any v from D ′ · I(B) and its couple v ′ from D ′(T ) · I(B). If v({i}) ≤ T for all i, then
actually v = v ′ and they make the same purchase from either M or M ′, so the contribution to both sides
is the same.
If v({i}) > T for some i (by event B, there is at most one such i), then perhaps v purchases an option
fromM which costs at most E (note that this will only happenwhenv({i}) < yi , since we are drawing from
D ′ and notD). We claim that the total revenue coming from such cases to the LHS is at mostO(ε)SRev∗(D).
To see this, observe that
∑
i Pr[v({i}) ≥ T ] ≤ (1 + O(ε))SRev∗(D)/T (otherwise this will contradict the
definition of SRev∗(D) by seing priceT on each item). erefore, even if we make the maximum possible
E in all such events, the total contribution is at most (1 +O(ε))SRev∗(D) · E/T = O(ε) · SRev∗(D).
If v({i}) > T for some i, and further v({i}) ≥ yi , then there are a few cases.
• Case 1: zi > v({i}) > T ≥ yi . en v will purchase the option (Si,1,pi,1), and so will v ′.
• Case 2: v({i}) > T ≥ zi . en v will purchase the option ({i},pi,2 ), and so will v ′.
• Case 3: zi > v({i}) ≥ yi ≥ T . en v will purchase the option (Si,1,pi,1), and contribute at most
yi (bi − ai ) + E to the revenue ofM .
• Case 4: v({i}) ≥ zi ≥ yi > T . en v will purchase the option ({i},pi,2 ), and contribute at most
zi (1 − bi ) + yi (bi − ai ) + E to the revenue ofM .
• Case 5: v({i}) ≥ zi > T ≥ yi . en v will purchase the option ({i},pi,2 ), and contribute at most
zi (1−bi )+yi (bi−ai )+E to the revenue ofM , andv ′will purchase the option (Si,1,pi,1), and contribute
at least yi (bi − ai ) to the revenue ofM ′.
So only the final three bullets have some unaccounted revenue from D ′ that is not achieved by D ′(T ).
Let us first argue that we can ignore the +E terms. Indeed, observe that each of the final three bullets only
occur when v({i}) > T for some i. e probability of this event is at most (1 + O(ε))SRev∗(D)/T , and so
therefore the total contribution of the +E terms to this cases is at most O(ε) · SRev∗(D). So just to clarify,
we now have:
RevM (D ′ · I(B)) ≤ RevM ′(D ′(T ) · I(B))
+
∑
i,yi>T
Pr[v({i}) ∈ [yi , zi )] · yi (bi − ai ) + Pr[v({i}) ≥ zi ] · (zi (1 − bi ) + yi (bi − ai ))
+
∑
i,zi >T ≥yi
Pr[v({i}) ≥ zi ] · zi (1 − bi ) +O(ε)SRev∗(D).
But now observe that for any i such that zi > T , we have that zi Pr[v({i}) ≥ zi ] ≤ Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥
T )). erefore,
(1 − bi )zi Pr[v({i}) ≥ zi ] ≤ ℓi (M ′) · Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
as ℓi (M ′) = 1 − bi for these items.
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Similarly, for any i such that yi > T , we have:
Pr
[
v({i}) ∈ [yi , zi )
] · yi (bi − ai ) + Pr [v({i}) ≥ zi ] · (zi (1 − bi ) + yi (bi − ai ))
= Pr
[
v({i}) ≥ yi
] · yi (bi − ai ) + Pr [v({i}) ≥ zi ] · zi (1 − bi ).
Also, Pr[v({i}) ≥ yi ] · yi ≤ Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )), and Pr[v({i}) ≥ zi ] · zi ≤ Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )). As
1 − ai = ℓi (M ′) (for these items), we get the desired claim. 
Finally, we now argue that going back from D ′(T ) to D(T ) doesn’t lose much, using Proposition 7.5.
LetM ′′ denoteM ′ aer multiplying all prices by (1 − ε).
Claim 8.24. RevM ′′(D(T ) · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM ′(D ′(T ) · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proof. e proof will follow from an application of Proposition 7.5 to D(T ) · I(B) and D ′(T ) · I(B), aer
computing δ (·, ·) via D(T )|B and D ′(T )|B. Observe that M ′′ and M ′ indeed satisfy the hypotheses, so we
just need to bound δ (D(T ) · I(B),D ′(T ) · I(B)).
Couple draws v from D(T )|B and v ′ from D ′(T )|B in the obvious way (first draw v from D(T )|B, and
then zero out values for items , i if v({i}) ≥ T ). Observe first that whenever v({i}) < T for all T , that
v = v ′, so the only contribution to δ (D,D ′) comes when v({i}) = T for some i. But observe also that
D(T )|(B∧v({i}) = T ) is subadditive over independent items, and that the maximum difference arises from
v([n] \ {i}) −v ′([n] \ {i}) = v([n] \ {i}). But now we can apply Proposition 8.10 to claim that the expected
value of v([n] \ {i}) when drawn from D(T )|(B ∧v({i}) = T ) is at most 6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2). So we get:
δ (D(T ) · I(B),D ′(T ) · I(B)) ≤ Pr[B] · δ (D(T )|B,D ′(T )|B)
≤
∑
i
Pr[B] · Pr [v({i}) = T |B] · (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))
≤ (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2)) ·
∑
i
Pr[v({i}) = T ]
≤ O(ε3) · Rev(D).
Above, the first line follows by observing that both v and v ′ are the zero function whenever event
B does not occur. If event B occurs, then both are drawn coupled from D(T )|B and D ′(T )|B. e second
line follows by the reasoning in the previous paragraph. e third line simply observes that Pr[v({i}) =
T |B] · Pr[B] = Pr[v({i}) = T ], and the final line observes that ∑i Pr[v({i}) = T ] is both O(ε4) and also
O(ε3) · SRev∗(D)/H . 
We now wrap up by observing that:
(1 − ε)RevM (D · I(B)) ≤ (1 − ε)RevM (D ′ · I(B))
≤ (1 − ε)RevM ′(D ′(T ) · I(B)) + (1 − ε)
∑
i
ℓi (M ′) · Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )) +O(ε)SRev∗(D)
≤ RevM ′′(D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′′) · Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )) +O(ε)Rev(D).
efirst line follows directly fromClaim8.22, the second fromClaim8.23, and the third fromClaim8.24.
Observe thatM ′′ is some mechanism, and so surely the supremum in the RHS of the proposition statement
exceeds the bound above. Because our original M was promised by Proposition 8.12, we also have that
O(ε)Rev(D) = O(ε)RevM (D). 
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Proposition 8.25. Let ri denote the optimal price for Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ). For any mechanism M ′ (which
contains only options purchased by some v ∈ support(D(T ))) let M ′′ denote the mechanism (M ′ |E )T , ®r , then:
RevM ′′(D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − 2ε)
(
RevM ′(D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
)
−O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proof. Like the proof of Proposition 3.5, we will consider a chain of inequalities going through D ′ · I(B),
which again draws a value v from D · I(B) and outputs either v ′ := v if v({i}) ≤ T for all i, or v ′ with
v ′(S) := v(S ∩ {i}) otherwise. We first observe that:
Claim 8.26. RevM ′ |E (D(T ) · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM ′(D(T ) · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proof. is follows from a direct application of Proposition 8.5. 
Next, we want to claim that:
Claim 8.27. RevM ′ |E (D ′(T ) · I(B)) ≥ RevM ′ |E (D(T ) · I(B)) −O(ε) · SRev∗(D).
Proof. To see this, couple draws v ′ from D ′(T ) · I(B) and v from D(T ) · I(B) in the obvious way. Observe
that v = v ′ whenever v({i}) < T for all i, and therefore v and v ′ purchase the same option.
If v({i}) = T , then maybe v purchased an option from M ′ priced at most E. But the total probability
that v({i}) = T for some i is at most SRev∗(D)/T
1−SRev∗(D)/T , so the total revenue contributed from these cases is
SRev
∗(D)·E/T
1−SRev∗(D)/T = O(ε) · SRev∗(D).
Finally, maybe v({i}) = T , and v purchased an option from M ′ priced more than E. en this option
must offer only item i, and v ′ will have exactly the same preferences as v among such options and make
the same purchase. 
Now, we want to understand the menu (M ′ |E )T , ®r (see Definition 3.4), but not yet with the prices further
reduced by (1 − ε). Below, let M ′′′ denote the menu (M ′ |E )T , ®r with all prices multiplied by (1 − ε) (so to
be clear, first M ′ is made E-exclusive, which reduces the prices by (1 − ε). en the exclusive options are
added, but the prices are not yet further reduced by (1 − ε)).
Claim 8.28. RevM ′′′(D ′ · I(B)) ≥ RevM ′ |E (D ′(T ) · I(B))+
∑
i ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )) −O(ε) · SRev∗(D).
Proof. We want to claim that the RHS is essentially breaking down the contribution to the revenue from
D ′ · I(B) into two parts: that from buyers with v({i}) ≤ T for all i, and that from buyers with v({i}) > T
for some i.
Let us consider coupled draws v,v ′ from D ′ · I(B) and D ′(T ) · I(B), coupled in the obvious way. en
if v({i}) ≤ T for all i, we in fact have v = v ′, and v will certainly not purchase one of the n extra options.
So v and v ′ will purchase the same option from M ′ |E .
Now let us consider the case that v({i}) > T for some i (by event B, there is at most one such i). en
maybev ′ purchases an option priced ≤ E fromM ′ |E . But again the total contribution of revenue from such
events can be at most O(ε) · SRev∗(D), so this is accounted for by the additionalO(ε) · SRev∗(D) term.
Finally, maybe v({i}) > T for some i, and v ′ purchases an option priced > E from M ′ |E which offers
only item i, and pays price pi . en v will either purchase exactly this option from M
′ |E , or perhaps the
additional option ({i},pi + riℓi (M ′)) if further v({i}) ≥ ri . So our total lower bound on the revenue from
D ′ · I(B) is:
Rev(M ′ |E )®r (D ′ · I(B)) +O(ε) · SRev∗(D) ≥ RevM ′ |E (D ′(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)ri · Pr[v({i}) ≥ ri ].
As ri · Pr[v({i}) ≥ ri ] = Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T )), we have the desired claim. 
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And finally, we just need to relate RevM ′′(D · I(B)) to Rev(M ′′′(D ′ · I(B)) (recall from the proposition
statement thatM ′′ := (M |E )T , ®r ).
Claim 8.29. RevM ′′(D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM ′′′(D ′ · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D).
Proof. is is a direct application of Proposition 7.5. Observe thatM ′′ and M ′′′ satisfy the hypotheses, so
our only job is to bound δ (D · I(B),D ′ · I(B)).
Couple (v,v ′) from (D · I(B),D ′ · I(B)) in the obvious way. en observe that v and v ′ are identical
whenever v({i}) ≤ T for all i. When v({i}) > T for some i (at most one i, by event B), we have that
v(S) ≥ v ′(S) for all S , and this difference is at most v([n] \ {i}) becausev is subadditive. We now compute
δ (D · I(B),D ′ · I(B)) via D |B and D ′|B.
Observe also that D |(B ∧ v({i}) > T ) is subadditive over independent items, and that v({j}) ≤ H for
all j , i. So now we can apply Proposition 8.10 to claim that the expected value ofv([n] \ {i}) when drawn
from D |(B ∧v({i}) > T ) is at most 6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2). So we get that:
δ (D · I(B),D ′ · I(B)) ≤ Pr[B] · δ (D |B,D ′|B)
≤
∑
i
Pr[B] · Pr [v({i}) = T |B] · (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2))
≤ (6BRev(D) + 4H/ln(2)) ·
∑
i
Pr[v({i}) = T ]
≤ O(ε3) · Rev(D).
Above, the first line follows by observing that both v and v ′ are the zero function whenever event B
does not occur. If event B occurs, then both are drawn coupled from D |B and D ′ |B. e second line
follows by the reasoning in the previous paragraph. e third line simply observes that Pr[v({i}) > T |B] ·
Pr[B] = Pr[v({i}) > T ], and the final line observes that ∑i Pr[v({i}) > T ] is both O(ε4) and also O(ε3) ·
SRev
∗(D)/H . 
And now we can put everything together:
RevM ′′(D · I(B)) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM ′′′(D ′ · I(B)) −O(ε) · Rev(D)
≥ (1 − ε)
(
RevM ′ |E (D ′(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
)
−O(ε) · Rev(D)
≥ (1 − ε)
(
RevM ′ |E (D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
)
−O(ε) · Rev(D)
≥ (1 − ε)2
(
RevM ′(D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
)
−O(ε) · Rev(D)
≥ (1 − 2ε)
(
RevM ′(D(T ) · I(B)) +
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)Rev(Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ))
)
−O(ε) · Rev(D).
e first line follows directly from Claim 8.29, the second from Claim 8.28, the third from Claim 8.27, and
the fourth from Claim 8.26. e final line simply bounds (1 − ε)2 ≥ (1 − 2ε). 
We now conclude the main theorem of this section, which is a slightly more precise version of eo-
rem 3.1 (in that it explicitly describes the process for geing a menu for D from one for D(T )).
eorem 8.30. Let ri denote the optimal price for Di · I(v({i}) ≥ T ), and let M be any mechanism guaran-
teeing RevM (D(T )) ≥ (1 −O(ε)) · supM ′
{
RevM ′(D(T ) +
∑
i ℓi (M ′)ri · Pr[v({i}) ≥ ri ]
}
. en:
Rev(M |E )T , ®r (D) ≥ (1 −O(ε))Rev(D).
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Further, observe that MC((M |E )T , ®r ) ≤ nMC(M) + n and thatWSMC((M |E )T , ®r ) ≤ nWSMC(M) + n.
Proof of eorem 3.1. eorem 3.1 now follows direction from eorem 8.30 together with Lemma 6.6.
eorem 8.30 implies that a (1 − O(ε))-approximation to ModRevMaxD,Rn (D(T ), ®r ) implies a (1 − ε)-
approximation to RevMaxD(D), and Lemma 6.6 implies that such an approximation can be achieved via
a (1 −O(ε))-approximation to RevMaxD(D(T , ®r )). Importantly, observe that all inputes are valid because
D is closed under one of the canonical truncations. 
9 Outline and Proofs: Symmetries and Optimal Mechanisms
In this section, we provide outlines and complete proofs for eorems 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. We begin with
a proof of eorem 4.3, which should appear straight-forward to readers familiar with [DW12]. We’ll
actually prove a slightly stronger statement to accommodate ModRevMax, but specialized to W = {®0}
the statement below is equivalent to eorem 4.3.
eorem 9.1 (Mild extension of [DW12]). For any item permutation Σ of partition size s, letD be the class of
distributions D which are k-demand over independent items, with each |support(Di )| ≤ c, and symmetric with
respect to Σ. Let alsoW be any set of vectors such that σ ( ®w) = ®w for all ®w ∈ W. en an optimal solution to
ModRevMaxD,W can be found in time poly(ncs ). Moreover, the mechanism output M has SSMC(M) ≤ ncs .
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we will usevi := v({i}) in the proof below, since allv ← D are k-demand.
First, letT1, . . . ,Ts denote the partition witnessing that the partition size of Σ is s. DefineC to pick exactly
one representative from each equivalence class of support(D) under Σ in the following way: say that item
j is equivalent to item ℓ if there exists an i such that {j, ℓ} ∈ Ti , and denote this by j ∼ ℓ. en C contains
all valuations in the support of D such that vj ≥ vℓ for all j ≤ ℓ such that j ∼ ℓ.
So for example, if Σ were the set of all item permutations, then C would contain all valuations in the
support of D such that vj ≥ vℓ for all j ≤ ℓ. Also, let Q(®v) denote the probability, when ®v ′ is drawn from
D, that ®v and ®v ′ are equivalent under Σ. Observe thatQ(®v) can be computed in time poly(n, c) for any ®v.23
Variables: p(®v), ∀®v ∈ C
xi (®v), ∀®v ∈ C, i ∈ [n]
ℓi , ∀i ∈ [n]
Maximize:
∑
®v ∈C
Q(®v) · p(®v) +
∑
i
wiℓi .
Such that: x j (®v) ≤ 1 − ℓi , ∀®v ∈ C, i ∼ j ∈ [n] (1)∑
i
xi (®v) ≤ k, ∀®v ∈ C (2)
xi (®v) ∈ [0, 1], ∀®v ∈ C (3)∑
i
vi · xi (®v) − p(®v) ≥
∑
i
vi · xi (®v ′) − p(®v ′), ∀®v, ®v ′ ∈ C (4)
xi (®v) ≥ x j (®v), ∀i ∼ j, i ≤ j . (5)
23To see this, observe that we can compute the probability of drawing exactly ®v by simply multiplying together Pr[vi ← Di ]
for all i . Aerwards, we just need to multiply by the number of elements equivalent to ®v . is can also be computed simply:
within each Ti , for each possible value x1, . . . , xc in the support of Dj (j ∈ Ti ), there are some number v(i, ℓ) items in Ti with
value xℓ , and therefore there are
( |Ti |
v(i,1),v(i,2), ...,v(i,c)
)
ways to permute withinTi , and
∏
i
( |Ti |
v(i,1),v(i,2), ...,v(i,c)
)
total members of
the equivalence class.
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Above, the variablesp(®v) denote the price of the menu option purchased by ®v (or any valuation equivalent
to ®v under Σ). Let xi (®v) denote the probability with which ®v receives item i (and also the probability
with which σ (®v) receives item σ (i)). Let ℓi denote the leovers for item i in the resulting menu. To
be explicit, the resulting menu is
⋃
®v ∈C (G(®x(®v)),p(®v), Σ), all permutations of the explicitly-found options
over permutations in Σ.
e objective then computes exactly the revenue of the output mechanism, plus the weighted leovers.
Equation (1) guarantees that the leovers are computed correctly — note that our menu will include
σ (®x(®v)) for all σ ∈ Σ, so we do need to have this constraint for all i ∼ j (and not just i = j). is will
(correctly) imply that ℓi = ℓj for all i ∼ j . Equation (2) guarantees, without loss of generality, that no
option contains more than k options in expectation (and therefore there is a distribution matching the
marginal probability which offers at most k items with probability one). is means that the buyer’s
expected value for an option is simply
∑
i vi · xi (®v ′). Equation (3) guarantees that all probabilities are, in
fact, probabilities.
Equations (4) and (5) handle the incentive constraints. Equation (4) guarantees that every valuation
vector ®v ∈ C prefers the menu option targeted at them versus one designed for any other ®v ′ ∈ C. However,
it does not guarantee that ®v prefers this option to (σ (®x( ®v ′)),p( ®v ′)) for any non-trivial σ . Equation (5)
guarantees that for all ®v ∈ C, their favorite menu option of the form (σ (®x( ®v ′)),p( ®v ′)) for any σ ∈ Σ is when
σ is the identity permutation, and therefore both equations together guarantee that every valuation vector
indeed prefers their intended option.
e feasibility constraints are exactly the space of all symmetric menus, and the objective function
correctly calculates their revenue plus weighted leovers. erefore, the solution to this LP is the optimal
menu. e menu is strongly symmetric with respect to Σ, and has strong symmetric menu complexity at
most |C |, and the LP has size poly(|C |). Finally, we argue that there are at most ncs elements of C, which
will conclude the proof.
If n(i,x) denotes the number of items j in Ti for which vj = x , then observe that fixing n(i,x) for all x
uniquely determines an element ofC (because these values must be permuted into decreasing order within
eachTi ). ere are only c different values of x in the support ofD j , and s different values of i, and there are
at most n possible options for each n(i,x). erefore, the total number of such vectors is at most ncs . 
9.1 Warmup: i.i.d. items
In this section, we consider a k-demand buyer with i.i.d. items. alitatively similar results for this seing
in the bounded case are already known due to [DW12]. While the main purpose of this section is as a
warmup, our results here do make quantitative improvements, and now extend to the unbounded case due
to eorem 3.1.
We begin by proposing a discretization of D for which we can directly apply eorem 4.3.
Definition 9.2. Let D be k-demand independent items and t-bounded. e canonical value-discretization
D ′
δ
with parameter δ is defined to first draw ®v ← D, and then round all values down to the nearest
number which can be wrien as tRev(D) times an integral power of (1 − δ ) (that is, round vi down to
(1−δ ) ⌊ln1−δ (vi /(tRev(D)))⌋tRev(D)), and then round down any values less than δRev(D)/k to 0. Observe that
D ′
δ
is still k-demand over independent items.
Proposition 9.3. Let D be k-demand over independent items and t-bounded, then
δ (D,D ′δ ) ≤ δVal(D) + δRev(D).
Proof. Consider an intermediate D ′ which first draws v from D and then rounds down all values to the
nearest power of (1−δ ) (but doesn’t further round especially small values to 0). It’s clear thatv(S) ≥ v ′(S)
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for all S . erefore, the maximum that we can possibly lose while rounding down from v to v ′ is δv([n]),
implying that δ (D,D ′) ≤ δVal(D).
Consider now further rounding down v ′ to v ′
δ
by replacing all values ≤ δRev(D)/k with 0. en
because v ′ is k-demand, we clearly lose at most δRev(D) in value for any set, and therefore δ (D ′,D ′
δ
) ≤
δRev(D). Because δ (·, ·) is a metric, we conclude that δ (D,D ′
δ
) ≤ δVal(D) + δRev(D) by the triangle
inequality. 
Corollary 9.4. Let D be k-demand over independent items and t-bounded for t ≥ 1. en δ (D,D ′
δ
) =
O(δt) · Rev(D).
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 9.3 and Proposition 8.10 (which provides an upper bound on
Val(D) ofO(t)Rev(D) as D is subadditive over independent items and t-bounded). 
Proposition 9.5. LetD bek-demand over i.i.d. items and t-bounded, andW be the subset ofRn
+
withwi = w j
for all i, j . en a (1 − ε)-approximation to ModRevMaxD,W can be found in time nO (t 2 ln(k)/ε4). Moreover,
the mechanism output has strong symmetric menu complexity at most nO (t
2 ln(k)/ε4).
Proof. We just apply Proposition 7.5 as follows. If we take δ = O(ε2/t), then we’ll have δ (D,D ′
δ
) =
O(ε2)Rev(D). is means that Rev(D ′
δ
) ≥ Rev(D) − O(ε) · Rev(D) by Corollary 7.6. So if we take M to
be the optimal mechanism for D ′
δ
, which has strong symmetric menu complexity at most nln1−δ (k/δ )+1 =
nO (ln(k)/δ
2) byeorem4.3 (this is because there are only ln1−δ (k/δ )+1 integers between 0 and ln1−δ (k/δ )+1
for values that vi ← (D ′δ )i can take), then Proposition 7.5 tells us that takingM ′ to be M but with prices
multiplied by (1 − ε), thenM ′ loses only an additional δ (D,D ′
δ
)/ε = O(ε)Rev(D) revenue.
Evaluating ln(k)/δ 2 = O(ln(k)t2/ε4) completes the proof. 
Proof of eorem 4.4. eorem 4.4 now follows immediately from eorem 8.30 and Proposition 9.5. 
9.2 Unit-demand over Asymmetric Independent Items
In this section, we show that even for an arbitrary distribution which is unit-demand over independent
items, which may initially have no symmetries whatsoever, we can still make use of eorem 4.3 anyway.
Observe that simply discretizing the values will no longer suffice, as there are asymmetric distributions
even when each marginal has support two. So we will additionally have to modify the probabilities within
each marginal. e high-level plan is as follows:
• First, apply the canonical value discretization. We already know from Corollary 9.4 how to bound
the error from this. However, this doesn’t immediately give us a symmetric distribution as even with
two distinct values per marginal we could have n distinct marginals.
• Next, we have to discretize the probability vector for each marginal. e challenge here is that a
simple nudge-and-round argument, even one that makes use of expectations, is doomed to fail if v
and its couple disagree by > ε on any item. Here is where we really get mileage out of Proposition 7.5
via a careful coupling of the original D and discretized distribution.
• Finally, we invoke eorem 4.3. e first bullet will result in at most − ln(δε)/δ different values,
and the second step will result in ln(n)/δ different possible probabilities, for a total of at most
(ln(n)/δ )− ln(δε)/δ different possible probability vectors. Aer discretizing the wi ’s as well, this will
leave us with at mostO((ln(n)/δ )− ln(δε)/δ ) different “profiles” for an item, and therefore the resulting
distribution is symmetric under some Σ with partition size O((ln(n)/δ )− ln(δε)/δ ).
We now proceed to define our probability discretization.
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Definition 9.6 (Canonical probability-discretization D∗
δ
and careful coupling). Let D be k-demand over
independent items and t-bounded. Define the canonical probability-discretizationD∗
δ
ofD with parameter
δ to be the following distribution:
• First, draw v ′ from D ′
kδ
, as defined in the canonical value-discretization.
• Define qi (x) := Pr[v ′i = x], and q′i (x) to be qi (x) rounded down to the nearest power of (1 − δ ). If
qi (x) < δ 2/n2, instead set q′i (x) = 0. Move the remaining probability mass to 0.
Define the careful coupling between D and D∗
δ
by “converting” a draw from D into a draw from D∗
δ
in
the following way:
• Draw v ← D, let v ′ be its couple in D ′
kδ
.
• For all i independently, do the following. Flip a coin which is heads with probability q′i (v ′i )/qi (v ′i )
(define 0/0 to be 0). If it lands heads, keep v ′i = vi . Otherwise, update v ′i = 0.
Lemma 9.7. Let D be k-demand over independent items and t-bounded for t ≥ 1. Let also M be any menu
in which all randomized allocations with probability one award at most k items. en δM (D,D∗δ ) ≤ O(δtk) ·
max{SRev∗(D),BRev(D)}.
e idea in the proof of Lemma 9.7 is the following. Simple nudge-and-rounds argue that if v and its
couple v ′ are close on every set, then no maer what sets appear in the nudge-and-round calculations, the
gap is small. Proposition 7.5 more carefully observes that it is wasteful to consider arbitrary sets, when
in fact only two such sets actually appear in the nudge-and-round analysis. And if the set which appears
has only a single item (or is a distribution over sets of size one), then it only maers whether v and v ′ are
close on this particular item, and not ones which never appear in the analysis.
Proof of Lemma 9.7. is proof will really make use of the carefulness in Proposition 7.5 as Corollary 7.6
does not suffice. We first observe that for all couples (v,v ′) from (D ′
kδ
,D∗
δ
), we have that v(S) ≥ v ′(S) for
all S . erefore, in the definition of δM (D,D ′), the term:
sup
SM (·)
{
E(v,v ′)←(D′
kδ
,D∗
δ
)[v ′(SM (v ′)) −v(SM (v ′))]
}
= 0.
So let us now focus on the other term in the definition of δM (D,D ′). Here, observe that no maer how
SM (·) is defined, its output is some randomized allocationwhich awards at most k items. So we can rewrite:
E(v,v ′)←(D′
kδ
,D∗
δ
)[v(SM (v)) −v ′(SM (v))] = Ev←D′
kδ
[
ES←SM (v)
[∑
i∈S
Ev ′←D∗
δ
|v
[
vi −v ′i
] ] ]
≤ Ev←D′
kδ
[
ES←SM (v)
[∑
i∈S
t(1 − q′i (vi )/qi (vi )))Rev(D)
] ]
Above, the first line just rewrites the expectation to first drawv, which defines SM (v), and then draw S
from SM (v), and then we can draw v ′ from D∗δ conditioned on v. Crucially for this line, we needed SM (v)
to be defined independently of v ′. e second line observes that drawing v ′ conditioned on v maybe
rounds each of at most k values all the way down to zero, which hurts at most tRev(D), but occurs not
with particularly high probability.
We now split up the above expectation into two cases: thosev for which q′i (vi ) = 0 for some i, and the
rest. We’ll call those v for which q′i (vi ) = 0 for some i rare, and denote by R the set of such v.
Ev←D′
kδ
[
ES←SM (v)
[∑
i∈S
t(1 − q′i (vi )/qi (vi ))Rev(D)
] ]
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= Ev←D′
kδ
·I(v ∈R)
[
ES←SM (v)
[∑
i∈S
t(1 − q′i (vi )/qi (vi ))Rev(D)
] ]
+ Ev←D′
kδ
·I(v<R)
[
ES←SM (v)
[∑
i∈S
t(1 − q′i (vi )/qi (vi ))Rev(D)
] ]
≤ Pr[v ∈ R] · tkRev(D) + Ev←D ·I(v<R)
[
ES←SM (v) [kδtRev(D)]
]
≤ δtkRev(D)/n + δktRev(D)
= O(δkt) · Rev(D),
where the first inequality follows from noting that
q′i (vi )
qi (vi ) ≥ 1 − δ . Since we have already established
that δM (D,D ′kδ ) ≤ δ (D,D ′kδ ) = O(ktδ ) (Corollary 9.4), and that δ (·, ·) is a metric, we get that δM (D,D∗δ ) =
O(ktδ ). 
We now conclude the main proposition of this section:
Proposition 9.8. Let D be k-demand over independent items and t-bounded for t ≥ 1. en a (1 − ε)-
approximation toModRevMax(D, ®w) can be found in timenO (ln(ntk/ε)O (kt ln(kt/ε )/ε2)). Moreover, the mechanism
output has strong symmetric menu complexity at most nO (ln(ntk/ε)
O (kt ln(kt/ε )/ε2)).
Proof. We will again make use of eorem 4.3 on D∗
δ
. First, observe that there are not too many possible
marginals in D∗
δ
. In particular, there are only ln(t/δ )/δ distinct values, and each non-zero value is drawn
with one of at mostO(ln(n/δ )) probabilities, so there are at most (ln(n/δ ))ln(t/δ )/δ different marginals. is
certainly means that D∗
δ
is symmetric with respect to some Σ of partition size (ln(n/δ ))ln(t/δ )/δ , but this
isn’t quite enough yet because we need ®w to be invariant under Σ as well.
So first, check if anywi ≥ Rev(D)/ε . If so, then just letM be the empty menu. We claim this is at least
a (1 − ε)-approximation. e empty menu will get ∑i wi ≥ Rev(D)/ε sinceM allocates no items. Also, the
benchmark is at most Rev(D)+∑i wi , meaning that ignoring the revenue from D entirely costs us at most
a ε fraction of our benchmark.
If not, then round all wi down to the nearest power of (1 − δ ), rounding all wi which are less than
εRev(D)/n down to 0. Refer to the new rounded values as wi . Now, observe that there are at most
O(ln(n/ε)/δ ) different values of wi . So we can say that item i ∼ j iff the marginal D∗δ onto items i and
j are the same and alsowi = w j . Now, there are still at mostO(ln(n/δ ))ln(t/δ )/δ equivalence classes (as long
as t = Ω(1/ε) and δ = O(ε), so we can solveModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) in time nO (ln(n/δ )ln(t/δ )/δ ), finding a menu
with strong symmetric menu complexity at most nO (ln(n/δ )
ln(t/δ )/δ ).
Now we just need to calculate the error. Let M denote the optimal solution to ModRevMax(D, ®w),
with quality
∑
i wiℓi (M) + RevM (D). en by Proposition 7.5, the mechanism M ′ with all prices rounded
down to the nearest multiple of (1 − ε) satisfies:∑
i
wiℓi (M ′) + RevM ′(D∗δ ) ≥ (1 − δ )
∑
i
wiℓi (M) + (1 − ε)RevM (D) −O(δkt)Rev(D)/ε − εRev(D).
So as long as we have δ = O(ε2/(tk)), then the subtracted terms account for at most ε · OPT, and the
quality of the optimal solution to ModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) is close to the desired optimum. Once we solve
ModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) and then multiply the prices by (1 − ε), we’ll get a menuM∗ satisfying:∑
i
wiℓi (M∗) + RevM∗ (D) ≥ (1 − ε) ·
(∑
i
wiℓi (M ′) + RevM ′(D∗δ )
)
−O(δkt)Rev(D)/ε .
Combining both equations and seing δ = O(ε2/(tk)) proves the proposition. 
36
Proof of eorem 4.5. eorem 4.5 now follows immediately from eorem 8.30 and Proposition 9.8 (and
upperbounding ln(1/ε) with 1/ε for ease of presentation). 
9.3 k-Demand Buyer with Constant Support Per Item
In this section we prove eorem 4.6, which considers a bidder who is k-demand over independent items,
where each Di has support at most c (note that the supports may be disjoint). e proof follows mostly
from Lemma 9.7, and we just need to again count the number of distinct marginals.
Proposition 9.9. Let D be k-demand over independent items and t-bounded for t ≥ 1, and have each Di
have support at most c. en a (1−ε)-approximation toModRevMax(D, ®w) can be found in time nO (ln(nt/ε))c .
Moreover, the mechanism output has strong symmetric menu complexity at most nO (ln(nt/ε))
c
.
Proof. Note that most of this proof is repeating steps in the proof of Proposition 9.8. e only difference is
in counting the number of distinct marginals. We will again make use of eorem 4.3 onD∗
δ
. First, observe
that there are not too many possible marginals in D∗
δ
. In particular, there are only c distinct values, and
each non-zero value is drawn with one of at mostO(ln(n/δ )) probabilities, so there are at mostO(ln(n/δ ))c
different marginals. is certainly means that D∗
δ
is symmetric with respect to some Σ of partition size
O(ln(n/δ ))c , but this isn’t quite enough yet because we need ®w to be invariant under Σ as well.
So first, check if anywi ≥ Rev(D)/ε . If so, then just letM be the empty menu. We claim this is at least
a (1 − ε)-approximation. e empty menu will get ∑i wi ≥ Rev(D)/ε sinceM allocates no items. Also, the
benchmark is at most Rev(D)+∑i wi , meaning that ignoring the revenue from D entirely costs us at most
a ε fraction of our benchmark.
If not, then round all wi down to the nearest power of (1 − δ ), rounding all wi which are less than
εRev(D)/n down to 0. Refer to the new rounded values as wi . Now, observe that there are at most
O(ln(n/ε)/δ ) different values of wi . So we can say that item i ∼ j iff the marginal D∗δ onto items i and
j are the same and also wi = w j . Now, there are still at most O(ln(n/δ ))c equivalence classes (as long as
c ≥ 2 and n = ω(log(1/ε))), so we can solve ModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) in time nO (ln(n/δ ))c , finding a menu with
strong symmetric menu complexity at most nO (ln(n/δ ))
c
.
Now we just need to calculate the error. Let M denote the optimal solution to ModRevMax(D, ®w),
with quality
∑
i wiℓi (M) + RevM (D). en by Proposition 7.5, the mechanism M ′ with all prices rounded
down to the nearest multiple of (1 − ε) satisfies:∑
i
wiℓi (M ′) + RevM ′(D∗δ ) ≥ (1 − δ )
∑
i
wiℓi (M) + (1 − ε)RevM (D) −O(δkt)Rev(D)/ε − εRev(D).
So as long as we have δ = O(ε2/(tk)), then the subtracted terms account for at most ε · OPT, and the
quality of the optimal solution to ModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) is close to the desired optimum. Once we solve
ModRevMax(D∗
δ
, ®w) and then multiply the prices by (1 − ε), we’ll get a menuM∗ satisfying:∑
i
wiℓi (M∗) + RevM∗ (D) ≥ (1 − ε) ·
(∑
i
wiℓi (M ′) + RevM ′(D∗δ )
)
−O(δkt)Rev(D)/ε .
Combining both equations and seing δ = O(ε2/(tk)) proves the proposition. 
Proof of eorem 4.6. e proof of eorem 4.6 now follows from Proposition 9.9 and eorem 8.30. 
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10 Outline and Proofs: Selling Separately with Low Symmetric Menu
Complexity
In this section we provide the proof of eorem 5.1, which draws on ideas from [BGN17]. Essentially, we
will partition the items up into exclusive buckets B0, . . . ,Bk , and one joint bucket B, and allow the buyer to
purchase at most one item from each exclusive bucket (deciding separately for each exclusive bucket) and
add this to either the entire joint bucket or none of the joint bucket. B0 will be a special exclusive bucket
where the prices might differ for each item inside, but for all other buckets the prices will be identical. We
first argue that a mechanism of this form has low strongly symmetric menu complexity.
Definition 10.1 (Bucket Mechanism). Let B0, . . . ,Bk ,B partition [n]. Let each item j in B0 have a price pj ,
and each bucket i > 0 have a price qi , and bucket B have a price q. en the bucket mechanism associated
with B0, . . . ,Bk ,B, ®p, ®q,q allows the buyer to pick any set S and pay price p(S) such that:
• For all i, we have S ∩ Bi ≤ 1.
• Either B ⊆ S or S ∩ B = ∅.
• p(S) = ∑j ∈B0∩S pj +∑i, |S∩Bi |=1 pi + q · I(S ⊆ B).
Lemma 10.2. Every bucket mechanism M with k buckets has MC(M) ≤ 2nk+1 , and SSMC(M) ≤ n · 2k+1 .
Proof. e menu complexity is straight-forward to compute: the total number of sets which are available
for purchase can be counted by picking any of the |Bi | items in Bi , separately for each i, and then deciding
whether or not to add B. ere are n choices for each bucket, and two for whether or not to add B.
To compute the strong symmetric menu complexity, consider the item permutation group Σ which
contains all permutations which separately permute items in Bi , for all i > 0. Observe that for any σ ∈ Σ
(below, define σ (S) := {σ (i), i ∈ S}):
• If the option (S,p) is onM , then so is (σ (S),p).
• ere are at most 2k+1n equivalence classes under Σ.
To see the final bullet, consider any two sets S,T for which:
• S ∩ B0 = T ∩ B0,
• |S ∩ Bi | = |T ∩ Bi |, for all i > 0,
• S ∩ B = T ∩ B,
there exists a σ ∈ Σ such that σ (S) = T . Observe that there are only 2k+1n choices above to make 24. 
Proof of eorem 5.1. Now, we define a bucket mechanism with O(1/ε3) buckets which has revenue at
least (1 − ε)SRev(D). To begin, break the items into three categories. Below, let qi = Pr[vi ≥ pi ], and
SRev(D) := ∑i piqi :
• High: items for which pi ≥ SRev(D)/ε2. We will set B0 to be all high items.
• Medium: items for which pi ∈ [ε3SRev(D), SRev(D)/ε2). All medium items will be in buckets
B1, . . . ,Bk .
• Low: items for which pi ≤ ε3SRev(D). We will set B to be all low items.
First, we observe that
∑
i∈B0 qi ≤ ε2. Assume for contradiction otherwise. en we could set price
SRev(D)/ε2 on each item separately and get revenue > SRev(D), a contradiction. We therefore conclude
that, conditioned on vi ≥ pi , vj < pj for all j ∈ B0 \ {i} with probability at least 1 − ε2 (by union bound),
and therefore the revenue generated from selling B0 exclusively is at least
∑
i∈B0 (1 − ε2)piqi .
24If all the items are in B0 then the menu size will be n, otherwise if there is at least one item not in B0 then there are at most
n choices to make regarding to which item (if any) to take from B0.
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Next, consider the random variable X =
∑
i∈B pi · I(vi ≥ pi ). en E[X ] =
∑
i∈B piqi , and X is a
sum of independent random variables, each supported on [0, ε3SRev(D)]. If ∑i∈B piqi ≤ εSRev(D), then
it is safe to just ignore these items. Otherwise if
∑
i∈B piqi ≥ εSRev(D), we claim that pricing the grand
bundle recovers almost all the revenue from these items. It follows from a basic Chernoff bound that the
probability thatX exceeds (1−ε/2)∑i∈B piqi is at least 1−e−ε2 ·(1/ε3)/3 = 1−o(ε). So either the revenue from
selling B is not negligible and selling all items together gets at least (1− ε)∑i∈B piqi , or their contribution
to the revenue is < εSRev(D) and the items can be discarded altogether.
Finally, consider the medium items. First, round all prices in this range down to the nearest power of
(1 − ε). Observe that there are at most ln1−ε (1/ε5) = O(ln(1/ε)/ε) such powers of (1 − ε) in this range.
Next, we will place all items in a bucket so that either (a) the total sum of probabilities in the bucket is
at most ε or (b) there is at most one item in the bucket. Observe that once we have such a bucketing, it
will again be the case that for all medium items i, the probability that the buyer is willing to purchase any
other items in i’s bucket is at most ε by union bound, and therefore the revenue of selling each of these
buckets exclusively is at least
∑
i<B∪B0 (1 − ε)piqi .
erefore, this scheme generates revenue at least (1− ε)∑i piqi = (1− ε)SRev(D). e only remaining
detail is to count the number of buckets for the medium items. We’ll first put all items with qi ≥ ε/2 into
their own buckets. For the remaining items, greedily pack them into buckets with other items of the same
price until the sum of probabilities within that bucket would exceed ε . Observe that now there are two
kinds of buckets: heavy buckets whose sum of probabilities exceeds ε/2 and (b) light buckets whose sum
of probabilities does not exceed ε/2. Observe that because each pi ≥ ε3SRev(D) that there can be at most
2/ε3 heavy buckets (otherwise we’d contradict the definition of SRev(D)). ere is only at most one light
bucket per level of the discretization as it is just collecting the leovers from that level. Hence the number
of light buckets is O(ln(1/ε)/ε) and therefore the total number of buckets is O(1/ε3).
So in conclusion, the above bucketing scheme has O(1/ε3) buckets, and has the property that the
revenue is at least (1 − ε)∑i piqi , proving eorem 5.1. 
11 A Barrier Example for an Additive Buyer
In this section we highlight an example of a (1/ε)-bounded distribution which is additive over independent
items but serves as a barrier to proving good (symmetric) menu complexity bounds. In a formal sense, the
known approaches for bounding the menu complexity of (1− ε)-approximately optimal mechanisms for a
bounded distribution are:
• Argue that SRev(D) ≥ (1 − ε)Val(D), perhaps because each Di is nearly a point-mass (recall that
while selling separately does not itself have low menu complexity, this suffices by eorem 5.1).
• Argue that BRev(D) ≥ (1 − ε)Val(D), perhaps because for all i, v({i}) ≤ ε2Val(D) with probability
one, and therefore v([n]) concentrates tightly around its expectation.
• (New, from Section 4) Argue that D is “close” to a highly symmetric distribution D ′. en use eo-
rem 4.3 to argue thatD ′ has a near-optimalmechanism of low symmetric menu complexity, followed
by Proposition 7.5 to argue that this menu (with discounts) also suffices for D.
We provide an example for which all three of these approaches fail, highlighting the main challenge
for future work. We overview the construction in Example 11.1 below, and highlight its main features in
Proposition 11.2, deferring a proof of Proposition 11.2 to Appendix C.
Example 11.1. For even n, an ε < 1 (one interesting choice discussed below is ε = 1/9), and k = Θ( ln(n)ε ),
consider n vectors in ®r1, . . . , ®rn ∈ {0, 1}k with |®ri |1 = k/2 for all i (i.e., each has exactly k/2 ones and k/2
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zeroes). Let it also be the case that for all i, j ∈ [n], we have |{ℓ : riℓ , rjℓ }| ≥ k/6.25 Define Di so that:
Pr[vi = x] =

ε
n · I(i is even) x = 1
2ε
n · I(i is odd) x = 12
(lnn)(1−ε)−ℓ
nk
· I(riℓ = 1) x = ε(1−ε)
ℓ
lnn , ℓ = 0, ...,k − 1
1 − Pr[vi > x] x = 0
Proposition 11.2. Any distribution D satisfying the definition in Example 11.1 has the following properties:
• Val(D) = 3ε/2.
• SRev(D) = ε .
• BRev(D) ≤ ε .
• vi ≤ 1 for all i with probability 1. erefore, D is 1/ε-bounded.
• For all Σ with partition size s, and all D ′ such that D ′ is symmetric with respect to Σ, the coupling
distance δ (D,D ′) ≥ ε2 · n−s6n . In particular, if s = o(n), then δ (D,D ′) ≥ ε2/6 − o(ε2).
Observe that Proposition 11.2 rules out any of the known approaches achieving beer than a 8/9-
approximation. Indeed, in order to prove that either of SRev(D) or BRev(D) beats a 2/3-approximation,
a beer bound than Val(D) on the optimal revenue would be necessary. is may indeed be the right
approach, but because D is 1/ε-bounded, it is already well inside the range where techniques like those
of our Section 3 or [BGN17] can yield traction. is rules out the first two approaches. In addition, the
partition size of Σ appears in the exponent of the symmetric menu complexity for optimal mechanisms on
distributions that are symmetric with respect to Σ, so the final bullet asserts that a direct application of
the approach in Section 4 cannot beat a (1 − √ε/8)-approximation with subexponential symmetric menu
complexity.26 In particular, the construction is valid for any ε < 1, so we can take ε small enough to have√
ε/8 < 1/9, which would rule out an 8/9-approximation via any of the three known approaches.
Focusing on arguments for this example (and slight generalizations) should be illuminating for future
progress. It seems that themissing ingredient is a near-optimal bound on the optimal revenuewithout rely-
ing on coupling with a symmetric distribution. e interesting feature of D is that it is highly asymmetric,
but the values in the support of the marginals which contribute to the asymmetry are small (much smaller
than Val(D)). Normally, this would imply that the expected value for the grand bundle concentrates, but
the point masses at 1 (or 1/2) ruin such a concentration.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 7.4
Proof of Lemma 7.4. First, it is clear that δ (D,D ′) ≥ δM (D,D ′) ≥ 0 for all D,D ′. It is also clear that
δ (D,D) = δM (D,D) = 0 for all D via the identity coupling. And it is also clear that δ (D,D ′) = δ (D ′,D) as
the text in both definitions is identical aer swapping the role of D,D ′.
To confirm that both satisfy the triangle inequality, consider three distributionsD,D ′,D ′′, and consider
any coupling which draws (v,v ′) from (D,D ′) and another which draws (v ′,v ′′) from (D ′,D ′′). Consider
now the coupled draws (v,v ′,v ′′) from (D,D ′,D ′′) defined in the natural way (couple draws (v,v ′) and
(v ′,v ′′) so that the v ′ component is equal, and then concatenate).
Observe first that:
max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v ′′(S)} ≥ max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′′(S)}.
max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v ′(S)} ≥ max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v(S)}.
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⇒ max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v ′′(S)}+ max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v ′(S)}
≥ max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v(S)}.
is therefore implies that:
E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)
[
max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v(S)}]
+E(v ′,v ′′)←(D′,D′′)
[
max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′(S) −v ′′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v ′(S)}]
≥ E(v,v ′′)←(D,D′′)
[
max
S ⊆[n]
{v(S) −v ′′(S)} + max
S ⊆[n]
{v ′′(S) −v(S)}] .
erefore, we have established that for any pair of couplings between D,D ′ and D ′,D ′′, we can find a
coupling forD,D ′′ such that he expected error is smaller. is also implies that the infimum over couplings
between D,D ′′ is certainly smaller than the sum of infimums over couplings between D,D ′ and D ′,D ′′,
establishing that δ (D,D ′) + δ (D ′,D ′′) ≥ δ (D,D ′′), and the triangle inequality.
A nearly-identical proof establishes the same for δM . Consider the same coupling among (D,D ′,D ′′),
and consider any SM ,S
′
M . en:
v(SM (v)) −v ′′(SM (v)) = v(SM (v)) −v ′(SM (v)) +v ′(SM (v)) −v ′′(SM (v)).
v ′′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v(S ′M (v ′′)) = v ′′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v ′(S ′M (v ′′)) +v ′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v(S ′M (v ′′)).
⇒E(v,v ′′)←(D,D′′)[v(SM (v)) −v ′′(SM (v)) +v ′′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v(S ′M (v ′′))]
= E(v,v ′,v ′′)←(D,D′)[v(SM (v)) −v ′(SM (v)) +v ′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v(S ′M (v ′′))]
+ E(v,v ′,v ′′)←(D′,D′′)[v ′(SM (v)) −v ′′(SM (v)) +v ′′(S ′M (v ′′)) −v ′(S ′M (v ′′))].
≤ sup
SM (·)
{E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)[v(SM (v)) −v ′(SM (v))]} + sup
SM (·)
{E(v,v ′)←(D,D′)[v ′(SM (v ′)) −v(SM (v ′))]}
+ sup
SM (·)
{E(v ′,v ′′)←(D′,D′′)[v ′(SM (v ′)) −v ′′(SM (v ′))]} + sup
SM (·)
{E(v ′,v ′′)←(D′,D′′)[v ′′(SM (v ′′)) −v ′(SM (v ′′))]}
= δM (D,D ′) + δM (D ′,D ′′).
Above, the first implication follows immediately from the top two equalities. e inequality follows
by observing that one candidate for SM (·) is to take as input v ′, and output S ′M (v ′′) (where v ′′ is drawn
from D ′′ conditioned on being coupled withv ′), or to take as inputv ′ and output SM (v) (wherev is drawn
from D conditioned on being coupled with v).
Observe now that we have established that for any pairs of mappings SM (·), S ′M (·), that we must have
E(v,v ′′)←(D,D′′)[v(SM (v))−v ′′(SM (v))]+E(v,v ′′)←(D,D′′)[v ′′(SM (v ′′))−v(SM (v ′′))], and therefore this inequal-
ity holds for the supremum over pairs of mappings as well, establishing that δM (D,D ′′) ≤ δM (D,D ′) +
δM (D ′,D ′′). 
A.2 Proof of eorem 4.1
Proof of eorem 4.1. Byeorem3.1, it iswithout loss of generality that, we only need to consider bounded
distributions D such that v{i} ≤ Rev(D)/ε4 for all i. We will propose a coupled distribution D ′ (that does
not need to be subadditive over independent items) and show that the distance between these distributions
is small. is, together with the fact that we have reduced the support to a bounded (and discrete) domain
will easily imply a finite bound on the menu complexity.
Consider the following distribution D ′. First, draw a valuation v ∼ D. If v < ε2Rev(D), let v ′ = 0.
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Otherwise round v ′ to the nearest multiple of ε2Rev(D). Note that D ′ is, by construction, stochastically
dominated by D so term the maxS {v ′(S) − v(S)} in δ (D,D ′) is 0 and we only need to bound v(S) − v ′(S).
Note that for all S ⊆ [n], v(S) − v ′(S) ≤ ε2Rev(D). erefore by Corollary 7.6 we get that Rev(D ′) ≥
Rev(D) − δ (D,D ′) ≥ (1 − ε)Rev(D).
LetM be the optimalmechanism forD ′, and letM ′ be the menuwith all the prices discounted by (1−ε).
By Proposition 7.5 we get that Rev′M (D) ≥ (1 − ε)RevM (D ′), and together with the above conclusion we
get RevM ′(D) ≥ (1 − ε)Rev(D). Note thatM and M ′ have the same menu complexity.
We now show that M has menu complexity at most
(
n
ϵ 6
)2n
, by bounding the total number distinct
valuations in the support of D ′. In order to define a valuation v ′ from the support of D ′ we need to
assign to each subset S ⊆ 2[n] one of n/ε6 discretized values. is is because v([n]) ≤ nRev(D)/ε4 (due to
subadditivity) and we are discretizing by multiples of ε2Rev(D). erefore there are at most n/ε6 possible
values for a subset. is implies that the number of possible valuations is upper bounded by
(
n
ε6
)2n
. us,
the total number of distinct options a buyer from D ′ buys is at most
(
n
ε6
)2n
, which implies the menu
complexity ofM (and M ′) is at most
(
n
ε6
)2n
. 
A.3 Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Proposition 7.7. Observe that we have, for any v, and any other (T ,q) ∈ M :
v(S) − p ≥ v(T ) − q.
For whatever option (T ′, (1 − ε)q) v chooses to purchase inM ′, we have:
v(T ′) − (1 − ε)q ≥ v(S ′) − (1 − ε)p.
If we now letT denote the originalmenu option fromwhichT ′was derived, we know thatv(T ) ≥ v(T ′),
we we can combine the inequalities to get:
q ≥ p − (v(S) −v(S ′)) .
Note that the payment inM ′ is (1 − ε)q. Taking an expectation over both sides, we get:
RevM ′(D) = (1 − ε)E[q] ≥ (1 − ε)E[p] − E[v(S) −v(S ′)]/ε = (1 − ε)RevM (D) − E[v(S) −v(S ′)]/ε .

Proof of Lemma 6.6. Consider an instance ofModRevMaxD,W with input D, ®w . Because D is c-bounded,
let’s take T := max{1, cRev(D)}, and we know that v({i}) ≤ T with probability one when v(·) ← D.
Consider now the truncation D(T , ®w), and any mechanism M for D. Let M ′ denote the same mechanism
M aer adding the option to purchase any item i exclusively for price (n2T 3)ℓi (M) − nT .
• First, observe that only a buyer with value n2T 3 for an item will purchase one of the new options.
All other v(·) drawn from D will make their same purchase fromM .
• So because
∑
i wi ≤ T , the total probability thatv({i}) = n2T 3 for any i is at most 1T 2n2 , and when this
event doesn’t occur, the valuation is just drawn from D. So RevM ′(D(T , ®w) · I(v({i}) < n2T 3, ∀i)) ≥
(1 − 1
T 2n2
)RevM (D).
• Next, consider a buyer with value v({i}) = n2T 3. With probability at least 1 − 1
T 2n2
they have
v({j}) ≤ T for all j , i, and therefore value atmost (n−1)T+(1−ℓi (M))n2T 3 for any option onmenuM
(by definition of leovers and subadditivity). eir utility for picking the exclusive option is exactly
n2T 3 − (n2T 3)ℓi (M) +nT , which is strictly larger. So this buyer will certainly purchase the exclusive
option. erefore: RevM ′(D(T , ®w) · I(∃ i,v({i}) = n2T 3)) ≥
∑
i (1 − 1n2T 2 )ℓi (M) win2T 3 (n2T 3 − nT ) ≥
(1 − 2
nT 2
)∑i ℓi (M)wi .
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Combining the last two bullets together yields:
RevM ′(D(T , ®w)) ≥
(
1 − 2
n
) (
RevM (D) +
∑
i
wiℓi (M)
)
.
Similarly, consider any mechanism M for D(T , ®w), and consider M ′ to be the same mechanism aer
keeping only options purchased when v({i}) ≤ T for all i. en clearly all buyers with v({i}) ≤ T
purchase the same option, and there are only more of these buyers in D since we have removed those
with v({i}) = n2T 3. Now we wish to figure out how much revenue could have possibly been lost from the
high buyers.
Observe that the maximum price possibly charged for an option on M ′ is ncRev(D), and so there is
some option priced ≤ ncRev(D) which awards item i with probability ℓi (M ′). erefore, the maximum
that a buyer would have possibly paid in M when their value for item i is n2T 3 is n2T 3ℓi (M ′) + ncRev(D).
erefore, even if buyers paid exactly thismuch for item i whenever their value was large, the total revenue
contributed would be at most:∑
i
ℓi (M ′)wi + ncRev(D)
n2T 3
≤
∑
i
ℓi (M ′)wi + Rev(D)
n
.
Sowe have shown both that the optima for both problems are equivalent up to amultiplicative (1±1/n),
and that in fact any (near)-optimal solution for RevMax(D(T , ®w)) can be efficiently transformed into one
for ModRevMax(D, ®w).

A.4 Results from Prior Work
For completeness (and because sometimes notation changes over time and it can be challenging to find the
exact result we cite), we repeat proofs of prior results below.
A.4.1 Proof of Lemma 8.3
For completeness, we repeat a proof of Lemma 8.3.
In the lemma below, recall that DS := ×i∈SDi (that is, the distribution D restricted to items in S .
LemmaA.1 is very similar to the “approximatemarginalmechanism” in [RW15] (which is exactly LemmaA.1
applied to Y = support(D)). For completeness, we include proofs of some steps.
Lemma A.1. Let D be subadditive over independent items, and let S, S¯ partition [n]. DefineD+ to first sample
v(·) ← D, and then output the valuation function v+(·) with v+(X ) := v(S ∩ X ) + v(X ∩ S¯). en for any
subdomain Y ⊆ support(D), and ε > 0
Rev(D · I(v ∈ Y )) ≤ Rev(D
+ · I(v ∈ Y ))
1 − ε +
Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y ))
ε
.
Proof. First, observe that because v is subadditive that v+(X ) ≥ v(X ) for all X , and therefore D+ stochas-
tically dominates D. Moreover, observe that for any X that:
v(X ) +v(X ∩ S) ≥ v(X ∩ S¯) +v(X ∩ S) = v+(X ) ≥ v(X )
e first inequality follows from monotonicity, and the second follows from subadditivity. erefore,
v+(X ) − v(X ) ≤ v(S) for all X . is immediately implies that for any randomized option X that v+(X ) −
v(X ) ≤ v(S) · I(v ∈ Y ), which in turn implies that for any menu M : δM (D,D ′) ≤ E[v(S) · I(v ∈ Y )] =
Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y )].
We can now apply Proposition 7.5 directly, using M as the optimal mechanism for D · I(v ∈ Y ). 
e following corollary is proved in [RW15] and follows from Lemma A.1 very similarly to a compa-
rable bound in [HN17] for additive buyers from their “marginal mechanism” lemma (we do not include a
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proof of the Marginal Mechanism lemma, and refer the reader to [CH13, HN17, RW15]).
Lemma A.2 (Marginal Mechanism on subdomain [CH13, HN17]). For any S ⊆ [n], and D such that with
probability one, when v(·) ← D we have v(X ) = v(X ∩ S) + v(X¯ ∩ S) (that is, v(·) is additive across S), and
Y ⊆ support(D): Rev(D) ≤ Rev(DS ) + Val(DS¯ ).
Proof of Lemma 8.3. Define Y to be the subdomain where v(S) ≥ v(S¯), and Y¯ := support(D) \ Y . en:
Rev(D) ≤ Rev(D · I(v ∈ Y )) + Rev(D · I(v ∈ Y¯ ))
≤ 3
2
(
Rev(D+ · I(v ∈ Y )) + Rev(D+ · I(v ∈ Y¯ ))) + 3 (Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y¯ )) + Val(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y )))
≤ 3
2
(
Rev(D+ · I(v ∈ Y )) + Rev(D+ · I(v ∈ Y¯ )) + 3 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ ))
≤ 3
2
(
Rev(DS · I(v ∈ Y )) + Val(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y )) + Rev(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y¯ )) + Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y¯ ))
)
+ 3 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ ))
≤ 3
2
(2Rev(DS ) + 2Rev(DS¯ )) + 3 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ ))
= 3 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ )) + 3 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ )) = 6 (Rev(DS ) + Rev(DS¯ )) .
e first inequality follows by Sub-Domain Stitching (Lemma 6.3). e second inequality follows from
Lemma A.1 on each of the two terms with ε = 1/3.
For the third inequality, observe that one way to sell items only in S is to sample (independently of the
buyers’ values) a draw fromv(S¯) ← DS¯ , and set pricev(S¯) to receive all items in S . If we treat the variables
definingv(S¯), and separately those defining v(S) as a full valuation function, then the buyer will purchase
set S exactly when v ∈ Y , and the expected revenue of this mechanism is therefore Val(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y )). We
therefore conclude that:
Rev(DS ) ≥ Val(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y )).
Rev(DS¯ ) ≥ Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y¯ ))).
e fourth inequality follows from a direct application of subdomain stitching, together with the ob-
servation that DS is exactly the distribution D
+
S (D
+ restricted to items S), and that DS¯ is D
+
S¯
.
e final inequality observes that Rev(D · I(E)) ≤ Rev(D) for all D and events E, and also uses the same
two inequalities above upper bounding Val(DS¯ · I(v ∈ Y ) and Val(DS · I(v ∈ Y¯ )). 
A.4.2 Proof of Lemma 8.13
Proof of Lemma 8.13. Let (S,p) dominate (T ,q). We argue that no buyer will ever purchase (T ,q). Consider
any buyer with valuevi ≥ q/Pr[i ∈ T ]who prefers (T ,q) to (∅, 0). e difference in utility for a buyer with
value vi for item i between receiving (S,p) and (T ,q) is:
vi · Pr[i ∈ S] − p −vi · Pr[i ∈ T ] + q.
We claim this is always > 0. Indeed:
vi · Pr[i ∈ S] − p −vi · Pr[i ∈ T ] + q = (vi − p/Pr[i ∈ S]) · Pr[i ∈ S] − (vi − q/Pr[i ∈ T ]) · Pr[i ∈ T ] > 0.
e last inequality follows as the definition of dominance guarantees thatvi−p/Pr[i ∈ S] ≥ vi−q/Pr[i ∈ T ],
and Pr[i ∈ S] ≥ Pr[i ∈ T ]. erefore, the first term is the product of two non-negative terms which are
each larger than the corresponding non-negative terms in the second product, and the product is at least as
large. Strict inequality follows as if both terms are equal, then (S,p) = (T ,q). Finally, observe that the term
(vi − q/Pr[i ∈ T ]) is indeed non-negative for any valuation v that would prefer (T ,q) to (∅, 0). erefore,
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any dominated option is never purchased, and we can safely remove it from the menu without affecting
revenue at all. 
B Formal Representation of a Symmetric Menu for a k-Demand Buyer
Here, we formally establish that a k-demand buyer can find their favorite option on menu M using time
poly(WSMC(M)).
Lemma B.1. Let v(·) be k-demand over independent items, and let M := ∪jMj where each Mj is symmetric
with respect to an item permutation Σj and
∑
j SSMC(Mj ) = C . en argmax(S,p)∈M {v(S) − p} can be found
in time poly(n,C).
Proof. First, observe that it is w.l.o.g. to consider only menus M such that each (S,p) ∈ M has |S | ≤ k
with probability one. Now, the only property that maers to a buyer with valuationv(·) is Pr[i ∈ S] for all
i,S , because the utility v derives from (S,p) is exactly ∑i vi Pr[i ∈ S] − p. When presented with a menu
M = ∪jMj , where each SSMC(Mj ) = dj , we can process each (S,p, Σj ) one at a time. Because Σj is an
item permutation, we can look at how it partitions the items into T1, . . . ,Tℓ . Within each Tx , there is an
option to permute the items in Tx so that the relative ordering of vi and Pr[i ∈ S] match within Tx . e
permutation which causes this for all x is clearly the buyer’s favorite option among all those in (S,p, Σj ).
e buyer’s value for this option is simply a dot product. e permutation and dot product together can
be computed in time O(n). By definition, there are ∑j dj = C representatives to check, so the total time
taken is poly(n,C). 
C Details for the Barrier Example
Here we provide the missing details for our barrier example of Section 11.
Lemma C.1. Let D satisfy the conclusions of Proposition 11.2. en an application of Corollary 7.6 cannot
guarantee that Rev(D ′) ≥ (1 − √ε/8)Rev(D).
Proof. To see this, observe that an application of Corollary 7.6 requires a choice of parameter δ . For this δ ,
we lose δRev(D) + δ (D,D ′)/δ . In order to possibly get subexponential symmetric menu complexity from
eorem 4.3, D ′ must be symmetric with respect to some Σ of partition size o(n), and therefore δ (D,D ′) ≥
ε2/6−o(ε2) (note that n is the parameter inside the lile-oh, so this term approaches 0 independent of ε as
n → ∞). erefore, as Rev(D) ≥ SRev(D) = ε , for any δ , the lost revenue is at least δε + ε2/(6δ ) − o(ε2/δ ),
which for any choice of δ is at least ε3/2/3 − o(ε3/2).
As Rev(D) ≤ Val(D), this means that the lost revenue in the bound is at least a ε3/2/3−o(ε3/2)3ε/2 = 2
√
ε/9 −
o(√ε) fraction, which exceeds a √ε/8 fraction as n →∞. 
Proof of Proposition 11.2. Let k = ln(n/ln(n))ε + 1. We first argue that n vectors ®r1, . . . , ®rn ∈ {0, 1}k exist, each
with exactly k/2 ones, and such that for all i, j there are at least k/6 indices where one ®ri has a 1 but ®rj
does not.
Claim C.2. For k =
ln(n/ln(n))
ε
+ 1, there exists ®r1, . . . , ®rn satisfying the hypotheses of Example 11.1.
Proof. We use the probabilistic method, and let each ®ri be a random element of {0, 1}k conditioned on
having exactly k/2 ones. Observe that for each index ℓ, the probability that riℓ = rjℓ + 1 is exactly 1/4.
Also observe that the events for all ℓ are negatively correlated (more precisely, the probability that this
fails for all ℓ ∈ S is at most (3/4) |S |), and therefore Chernoff bounds with negative correlation (e.g. [IK10])
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imply that except with probability e−Ω(k) = n−Ω(1/ε), there are at least k/6 such ℓ. Taking a union bound
over all k2 pairs proves the claim. 
Now we want to prove the bullets.
Claim C.3. Val(D) = 3ε/2.
Proof. is follows simply by observing that the large value in the support contributes exactly ε/n to
Val(Di ), and there are k/2 other values in the support which each contribute exactly ε/(nk) to Val(Di ), for
a total of Val(Di ) = 3ε/(2n). 
Claim C.4. SRev(D) = ε .
Proof. To see that SRev(D) ≥ ε , consider seing price 1 on all even items and 1/2 on all odd items.
To see the upper bound, consider any price ε(1−ε)
j
ln(n) for some j ∈ {0, 1, ...,k − 1}. en the item sells
with probability at most 2εn +
∑j
h=0
ln(n)(1−ε)−h
nk ≤ 2εn + ln(n)((1−ε)
−(j+1)−1)
nk · 1−εε . erefore the revenue of seing
price ε(1−ε)
j
lnn is at most (1 − ε)j 2ε
2
n lnn +
(1−(1−ε)j+1)
nk
< ε
n
. 
Claim C.5. BRev(D) ≤ ε − ε2.
Proof. Let p be a price we consider for the grand bundle. Clearly if p < ε − ε2 then the revenue will be at
most ε − ε2 since the bundle sells with probability at most 1. Let A be the event that none of the xi draws
a value of 1 or 1/2. By the union bound Pr(A) ≥ (1− 2ε) and Pr(¬A) ≤ 2ε . Conditioned on A, the expected
value of the bundle is µ ≤ ε
2(1− 2ε
n
) . Let δ > 0 be such that p =
1+δ
1−2ε/n
ε
2 . Note that conditioned on A the
range of xi is [0, εlnn ]. We blow up the values by lnnε in order to apply the following Chernoff bound for
[0, 1] continuous random variables:
Pr(
∑
xi > p ∧A) ≤ Pr(
∑
xi > p |A)Pr(A) ≤ (1 − ε)e
−δ 2 lnn
4(1−ε )(1+δ /3) .
Note that if p < ln(n) then the second term in the upper bound above becomes poly( 1
n
) so the revenue
is at most (1 − ε) lnnn < (1 − ε)ε . If p > lnn then since δ = Ω(p) the probability of sell becomes O(e−δ ).
erefore the revenue is (1 − ε)δO(e−δ ) < (1 − ε)ε for sufficiently large n.
In the event thatA does not occur at least one of the valueswill be large. By thework above, conditioned
on A, the contribution from the small items to the bundle value will be at most 2ε with high probability.
So consider seing price p ∈ (ε − ε2, 1/2 + 2ε). en such a price will sell with low probability condi-
tioned onA, or when eventA does not occur. But the probability of ¬A is at most 3ε/2 by the union bound,
and therefore generates revenue at most 3ε/4 + o(ε).
Consider instead seing pricep ∈ (1/2+2ε, 1+2ε). en the grand bundle will sell with low probability
conditioned on A, or when two of the odd items have value 1/2, or when an even item has value 1. By the
union bound, this happens with probability at most ε/2 + ε2/n, generating revenue at most ε/2 + o(ε).
Finally, consider any p ∈ (k + 2ε,k + 1 + 2ε). en the grand bundle only sells when at least k items
take their high value. e probability that this occurs by the union bound is O(εk ), and therefore no large
prices can yield good revenue either. 
e fourth bullet is trivial, but we do quickly confirm that each Di is indeed a valid distribution.
Claim C.6. For all i, we have Pr[vi = 0] ≥ 0.
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Proof. e mass at x , 0 is non-negative by construction, and by definition the probabilities sum to 1, so
we just need to make sure that the mass at 0 is non-negative. Showing that 2εn +
(∑k−1
i=0
(lnn)(1−ε)−i
nk
)
< 1
suffices since the density will add up to 1 by construction. Some arithmetic shows that
2ε
n
+
k−1∑
i=0
(1 − ε)−i lnn
nk
≤ 2ε
n
+
lnn
nk
( (1 − ε)−k+1 − (1 − ε)
ε
)
≤ 2ε
n
+
1
εk
< 1,
where the last line follows by noting that ε is a constant and taking sufficiently large values of n. 
Claim C.7. For any i , j , δ (Di ,D j ) ≥ ε2/(3n).
Proof. We say Di ,D j disagree on a coordinate ℓ if ®riℓ , ®rj ℓ. Suppose Di ,D j disagree on coordinate ℓ (and
say ®riℓ = 1). In the best case, either ®rj(ℓ−1) = 1 or ®rj(ℓ+1) = 1. In the former case, we couple as much mass
as we can from Di at
ε(1−ε)ℓ
lnn to D j at
ε(1−ε)ℓ−1
lnn . e contribution to the distance metric we care about from
this displacement will be at least(
lnn(1 − ε)−ℓ − lnn(1 − ε)−(ℓ−1)
nk
)
ε(1 − ε)ℓ
lnn
+
lnn(1 − ε)−(ℓ−1)
nk
(
ε((1 − ε)ℓ−1 − (1 − ε)ℓ)
lnn
)
≥ 2ε
2
nk
.
e calculations for the laer case are nearly identical. Importantly, observe that each disagreement
contributes error 2ε2/(nk), and there are at least k/6 disagreements. So the total contribution is at least
ε2/(3n). 
Corollary C.8. Let D ′ be symmetric with respect to Σ, and let Σ have partition size s. en δ (D,D ′) ≥ ε2 n−s6n .
Proof. Consider any Σ which has partition size s. en there are at most s distinct marginals of D ′. Note
further that if there are x items in a partition, the total coupling error contributed by that partition must
be at least (x − 1)ε2/(6n) (because if any item in that partition is within ε2/(6n) of the marginal, all of the
rest must be strictly further by the above claim). Because there are at most s distinct marginals in D ′, we
get that the sum over all partitions of their size minus one is at least n − s, proving the corollary. 
is completes the proof of Proposition 11.2. 
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